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WHAT SHOULD LAW SCHOOL STUDENT CONDUCT 
CODES DO? 
Steven K. Berenson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the highly publicized and financially devastating collapses of 
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and other large corporate entities, 
which were at least in part the result of malfeasance on the part of their 
corporate executives and the professionals who served the corporations, 
the topic of professional ethics has once again come to the forefront of 
public consciousness.  Recent months have seen calls for increased 
instruction in ethics in undergraduate, business, and other professional 
schools,1 new codes of conduct for individual corporations2 and 
professions such as business and accounting,3 and the proliferation of 
ethics officers for corporations.4  And while it is true that most of the 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law.  The author wishes to thank Ilene 
Durst, Anders Kaye, and Marc Rohr for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft.  The author also 
wishes to thank Genail Anderson, Thomas Jefferson School of Law Class 2004, for helpful research 
assistance during the preparation of this article.  Last, but certainly not least, the author wishes to 
thank Deanna Sampson for continuing support. 
 1. See, e.g., Stacy Humes-Schulz, Ethical Soul Searching at Business Schools, FINANCIAL 
TIMES, July 12, 2002, at 9; Lisa Eisenhauer, Scandals Bolster Calls for Ethics Training, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, July 15, 2002, at A5.  Even President Bush called on business schools to do a 
better job of teaching business ethics to future executives.  See Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, 
Enron: Lessons and Implications: Lawyers, Ethics and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 10 & n.8 
(2002). 
 2. See Harry Wessel, On the Job Ethics, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, June 16, 2003.  
See also Amanda Sinclair, Codes in the Workplace: Organisational versus Professional Codes, in 
CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 88 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Block eds., Melb. U. Press 
1996). 
 3. See Jenny B. Davis, CORPORATE-CRIME FIGHTER: Ex-Prosecutor Teams With 
Prisoners to Teach Ethics to Executives, 89 A.B.A.J. 26 (Feb. 2003). 
 4. See Elizabeth Chamblis and David Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics Advisors, 
General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 AZ. L. REV. 559 
(2002); Deroy Murdock, Corporate Need for Ethics, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, August 28, 
2003, at B8, available at http://www.shns.com/shns/g_index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=MURDOCK-
1
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attention in these discussions has focused on “accountants, managers, 
and boards of directors[,]”5 it is also indisputable that lawyers were 
involved in virtually every questionable transaction these entities 
engaged in.6  Therefore, it seems appropriate that lawyers’ ethics 
undergo similar scrutiny. 
It also seems that the time may be ripe for renewed interest in legal 
ethics in light of the apparent temporal cycles that effect such inquiries.  
It has often been noted that the Watergate scandal of the mid 1970s was 
a major force in driving the large-scale effort to focus on legal ethics as a 
subject meriting serious academic teaching and scholarship.7  And, a 
little more than a decade later, the financial scandals of the late 1980s 
gave rise to another call for increased attention to legal ethics.8  Thus, 
with another period of a little more than a decade having passed, perhaps 
the time is ripe for another round of inquiries in light of the most recent 
scandals. 
All along the way, extensive literature has developed regarding 
effective and ineffective ways of teaching ethics in law school.9  It is not 
the intention of this article to repeat insights developed in that body of 
work.  However, one aspect of what I am going to refer to as a law 
school’s “infrastructure” for teaching ethics,10 namely, the law school’s 
 
08-28-03. 
 5. Rhode & Paton, supra note 1, at 10. 
 6. Id. at 10-11. 
 7. See, e.g., Kathleen Clark, Legacy of Watergate for Legal Ethics Instruction, 51 HASTINGS 
L.J. 673, 675 (2000); Deborah L. Rhode, Integrity in the Practice of Law: If Integrity is the Answer, 
What is the Question?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 333, 339-40 (2003) [hereinafter Integrity]; Ronald D. 
Rotunda, Teaching Legal Ethics a Quarter of a Century after Watergate, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 661 
(2000). 
 8. Major scandals during this time period that resulted in a re-examination of the ethical 
implications of the conduct of the lawyers involved included the OPM Leasing Services, Inc. 
scandal and the bankruptcy of Lincoln Savings and Loan Corp.  See Roger C. Cramton, Enron and 
the Corporate Lawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS. LAW. 143, 143 & nn.2-3 
(Nov. 2002).  See also Integrity, supra note 7, at 340 & n.34. 
 9. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 357 (1998); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, W.M. Keck Foundation Forum on the 
Teaching of Legal Ethics: Introduction to the Keck Forum on the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 38 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1 (1996); David Luban & Michael Milleman, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in 
Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995); James E. Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics 
Teaching in Law School: Replacing Lost Benefits of an Apprentice System in an Academic 
Atmosphere, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 83 (1991); Thomas D. Morgan, Use of the Problem Method for 
Teaching Legal Ethics, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 409 (1998); Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics 
Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 719 
(1998); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics with Stories about Clients, 39 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 421 (1998); W. Bradley Wendel, Teaching Values in Law School: Teaching Ethics in an 
Atmosphere of Skepticism and Relativism, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 711 (2002). 
 10. Of course, the ABA required course on legal ethics (often titled “Professional 
2
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code of student conduct, has received very little attention in the 
literature.11  Yet law school codes, at least by their own terms, purport to 
have a constitutive function in educating students to become ethical 
members of the legal profession.12 
Another reason to focus attention on student codes at this juncture 
is recent evidence of continued increases in student misconduct.13  For 
example, a recent study conducted by Rutgers University Professor 
Donald L. McCabe noted that thirty-eight percent of the undergraduate 
students surveyed indicated that they had engaged in at least one 
instance of “cut and paste” internet plagiarism, i.e., copying information 
directly from an internet source and using it without attribution in a 
paper submitted for credit in the past year.14  Moreover, recent suits 
brought by the record industry against college students who purportedly 
engaged in illegal “file swapping” involving copyrighted music indicate 
another instance of widespread student misconduct.15  And, additional 
evidence exists that academic misconduct has been increasing on 
campuses for some time.16 
 
Responsibility”) is the core of the totality of instruction in ethics offered by law schools - what I am 
referring to here as the school’s infrastructure for teaching ethics.  See generally, Luban & 
Milleman, supra note 9, at 38-39.  Additionally, many schools offer upper level elective courses that 
devote some or all of their time to discussion of ethical issues, and some schools have gone so far as 
to require the teaching of ethics “pervasively” throughout the curriculum.  Id. at 39 & n.31.  See 
also DEBORAH L. RHODE, ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD xxix (2d ed. 1998).  More recently, 
a small number of schools have sought to encompass ethics teaching in a broader effort to teach 
“professionalism” throughout the law school experience.  See, e.g., Kimberly C. Carlos, Comment, 
The Future of Law School Honor Codes: Guidelines for Creating and Implementing Effective 
Honor Codes, 65 UMKC L. REV. 937, 940, 942 (1997) (citing codes from University of Alabama 
School of Law and Thomas M. Cooley Law School). 
 11. Notable exceptions include Carlos, supra note 10, at 937 and Larry A. DiMatteo & Don 
Weisner, Academic Honor Codes: A Legal and Ethical Analysis, 19 S. ILL. U. L. J. 49, 57 n.55 
(1994). 
 12. See, e.g., Carlos, supra note 10, at 942 (quoting Thomas M. Cooley Law School’s Honor 
Code). 
 13. Linda McGuire, Lawyer or Lying?  When Law School Applicants Hide Their Criminal 
Histories and Other Misconduct, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 709, 720 (2004). 
 14. See Sara Rimer, A Campus Fad That’s Being Copied: Internet Plagiarism Seems on the 
Rise, NEW YORK TIMES, September 3, 2003, at 7. 
 15. See, e.g., Monitoring of Internet Use Part of Campus Life at Reno University, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIBUNE, September 15, 2003, at A-5 (hereinafter Monitoring of the Internet). 
 16. For example, two 1993 surveys indicated that between two thirds and more than 80% of 
college graduates admitted to cheating at least once during their academic careers.  See Curtis J. 
Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University Student, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 290 & n.1 (1999) (citing Donald L. McCobe & Linda Klebe Trevino, 
Academic Dishonesty: Honor Codes and Other Contextual Influences, 64 J. HIGHER EDUC. 522, 531 
(1993) (stating two out of three students surveyed admitted cheating) and University Tolerates 
Cheating, Professor Charges, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, May 17, 1997 (indicating that 82% 
admitted cheating).  More recent empirical data points to similarly high incidences of academic 
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In any event, the connection to law school codes here may seem 
tenuous.  First, both of the above discussed recent examples of 
misconduct involved undergraduate, rather than law students.  
Nonetheless, many, if not most law students are not far removed in time 
from their undergraduate days.  Second, the morality, if not the legality 
of “file swapping” may be open to question.17  At least where 
prospective law students are concerned, however, the widespread lack of 
concern regarding the legality of file sharing,18 should give those 
concerned with legal education some pause.  Third, at least as far as 
music sharing goes, while such conduct may be illegal, such illegality 
may not be addressed by academic conduct codes.19  In many instances, 
however, the illegal file sharing took place over the colleges’ computer 
networks,20 therefore involving the academic institutions in the 
misconduct in a manner that may not take place with regard to other 
forms of “personal” misconduct. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, an examination of law school 
conduct codes seems warranted.  The purpose of this article, therefore, is 
to evaluate the role student codes may play in the development of ethical 
lawyers.  In order to do so, the next Part of this article examines ethics 
codes generally, focusing in particular on the functions of such codes, 
the elements of such codes, and important considerations that must be 
taken into account in the development of such codes.21  Three commonly 
recognized functions of ethics codes are aspiration, education, and 
regulation.22  Typical elements of codes include prescriptions, sanctions, 
and procedures.23  Because the different functions and elements of codes 
may call for different treatment in terms of the language and structure of 
the codes’ provisions, difficult choices must be made in prioritizing 
 
dishonesty.  See Sara Sun Beale, Governmental and Academic Integrity at Home and Abroad, 72 
FORDHAM L. REV. 405, 406 (2003) (citing studies).  See also McGuire, supra note 13, at 720-21. 
 17. Amy Harmon, Download Dilemma: Talking to the Kids, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE, 
September 15, 2003, at C-1.  Of course, many of those surveyed also saw nothing wrong with 
“internet plagiarism” either.  See Rimer, supra note 13, at 7 (stating nearly half of those surveyed 
saw internet plagiarism as “trivial” or “not cheating at all”). 
 18. See Ted Bridis, Most Music Downloaders Don’t Care About Copyrights, SAN DIEGO 
UNION TRIBUNE, August 4, 2003, at C-3. 
 19. While some academic conduct codes make it a violation of the code to engage in a broad 
range of misconduct, including illegality, which may or may not be directly related to the academic 
enterprise, other codes restrict their prohibitions to conduct that directly relates to the academic 
enterprise. 
 20. See Monitoring of the Internet, supra note 14, at A-5. 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See infra Part II.A. 
 23. See infra Part II.B. 
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among possible functions and provisions in order to safeguard the codes’ 
effectiveness.24 
In order to establish such priorities, this article next looks at 
possible differences between effective academic and professional 
codes.25  In the following section, the article examines the particular 
context of law schools and considers whether that context should impact 
the content of student conduct codes.26  For example, because legal 
education is a form of graduate education, a somewhat different form or 
function for a code might be appropriate as compared to that of an 
undergraduate institution.27  Additionally, legal education is professional 
education, i.e., training for service in the legal profession.  This fact may 
impact the form and content of codes and call for differences between 
codes in graduate professional education and other types of graduate 
education, for example, graduate education in the arts and sciences.28  
Also, the legal profession’s own code of ethics plays an unusually 
prominent part in the profession’s own identity.  This fact, along with 
the history and development of the profession’s code of ethics, may 
impact the desirable form and content of law school student codes.29 
Next, all of these considerations will be drawn together in making 
recommendations with regard to what the priorities for law school codes 
of conduct should be.30  The conclusion, based upon the issues noted 
above and discussed herein, is that priority should be placed upon a law 
school code’s regulatory function.  While a law school code may be able 
to accomplish certain limited educational functions, such as providing 
examples in the code of conduct that will violate its prescriptions, 
providing for significant student involvement in code administration, 
and making code proceedings and decisions accessible to the student 
body, such a code is unlikely to achieve broader educational objectives 
such as enhancing education in ethics throughout the law school 
experience unless legal educators are willing to make significant 
changes to the present law school curriculum.  Because the latter 
possibility seems unlikely, the educational function of a law school code 
should be a lower priority than its regulatory function.  Additionally, 
because of the general difficulties codes have in achieving aspirational 
 
 24. See infra Part II.C. 
 25. See infra Part III. 
 26. See infra Part IV. 
 27. See infra Part IV.A. 
 28. See infra Part IV.B. 
 29. See infra Part IV.C. 
 30. See infra Part V. 
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objectives, along with tensions between codes’ regulatory and 
aspirational functions, the conclusion here is that aspirational goals 
should largely be eliminated from law school conduct codes, and should 
be reassigned to a separate honor oath or pledge.  Finally, in light of the 
above-described priorities, the article concludes by making specific 
recommendations regarding the appropriate substance and procedures 
that should be incorporated in a law school code.31 
Before proceeding to the next section, a discussion relating to 
nomenclature is warranted.  Use of the term law school “conduct code” 
in the above-discussion was neither accidental nor neutral.  That term, is 
only one of a number of such terms that are used to describe the codes 
that govern student conduct during law school.  Other familiar variations 
include “honor code,” “ethics code,” and “disciplinary code.”  The titles 
of most law schools’ codes seem to have been chosen rather 
indiscriminately, with little apparent connection between the content of 
the code and the title chosen to describe it.  However, it seems that the 
different titles that are applied to various codes imply very different 
things regarding the purpose and content of the codes attached to them.  
For example, use of the title “honor code” would seem to imply a system 
based on the concept of honor.  Professor W. Bradley Wendel defines 
honor as: 
an ethical system in which one’s outward presentation as a worthy 
person is confirmed or challenged by others in the relevant social 
group, who confer honor on persons exhibiting valued characteristics 
and shame on those who deviate from prescribed standards.32 
As Professor Wendel further notes, while it would likely be 
possible to codify a true honor code in terms of a detailed set of rules, 
because determinations of honor and shame tend to be extremely context 
dependent, and based upon a great range of particular understandings of 
the relatively small social group involved, honor systems tend to be 
codified in very general terms, or not codified at all.33  Therefore, a true 
law school “honor” code likely would feature a small number of very 
general standards,34 or perhaps would be unwritten entirely, and would 
 
 31. See infra Part VI. 
 32. W. Bradley Wendel, The Legal Profession: Looking Backward: Regulation of Lawyers 
Without the Code, The Rules, or the Restatement: Or, What Do Honor and Shame Have to do With 
Civil Discovery Practice?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1567, 1577-78 (2003). 
 33. Id. at 1578-79.  Indeed, Professor Wendel goes on to argue in his article that broad 
concepts of honor and shame might play a constructive role in curbing civil discovery abuse, in lieu 
of detailed codified legal rules governing the discovery process.  Id. at 1599-1616. 
 34. Indeed, perhaps the best known academic honor code is that of the United States Military 
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be interpreted in terms of widely shared understandings within the law 
school community regarding the meaning of the terms of the code. 
On the other hand, use of the term “code of ethics” seems to imply 
that the code reflects certain moral precepts.35  While some philosophical 
traditions,36 and even some legal scholars,37 might argue for a sharp 
distinction between the concepts of ethics and morality, most would 
contend that the two are intertwined, and a code of ethics must therefore, 
of necessity, embody certain moral principles.38  And, as will be 
discussed in greater detail below, the inclusion of broad moral principles 
in a conduct code may require a choice in terms of code provisions in 
favor of broad and abstract standards, rather than narrow and particular 
rules.39  Use of the term “disciplinary code,” by contrast, seems to place 
a heightened emphasis on the sanctions available under the code in the 
event that its substantive provisions are violated.40 
Finally, use of the term law school “conduct code,” without 
reference to terms such as “honor” or “ethics,” would seem to reflect a 
more particular focus on specific rules regulating the behavior of law 
students, without regard to the informal community norms that are at the 
center of honor systems, or the moral precepts that are at the center of 
ethics codes.41  Of course, no set of rules governing conduct can be 
totally devoid of moral considerations, but use of the term conduct code 
clearly reflects a de-emphasis of such considerations. 
It is contended here that the term “code of conduct” is the more 
appropriate title for law school codes, both as a descriptive and as a 
normative matter.  As a descriptive matter, a review of law school codes 
indicates that, regardless of the title that is attached to them, the vast 
majority of law school codes consist primarily of a large number of 
 
Academy (USMA) at West Point, which in its entirety consists of a mere thirteen words: “A cadet 
will not lie, cheat or steal, nor tolerate those who do.”  DiMatteo & Weisner, supra note 11, at 56 
(quoting UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY PRESS, HONOR GUIDE FOR OFFICERS 4 (1958)).  For 
a thorough historical and analytic account of the USMA code, see John H. Beasley, The USMA 
Honor System - A Due Process Hybrid, 118 MIL. L. REV. 187 (1989). 
 35. Cf. Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 49-50 (noting that removal of the term “ethics” 
from the title of the professional code governing lawyers was emblematic of the removal of moral 
precepts from the substance of the code itself). 
 36. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS xv-xvi (3d ed. 2001) 
(discussing Hegel’s philosophy). 
 37. See Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 46 (discussing the views of Yale Law School 
Professor Geoffrey Hazard). 
 38. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 36, at xvi. 
 39. See infra notes 59-94 and accompanying text. 
 40. See infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 41. Indeed, it is the change in terminology from “ethics” to “code” that Luban and Milleman 
decry.  LUBAN & MILLEMAN, supra note 9, at 44-45. 
7
Berenson: What Should Law School Student Conduct Codes Do?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
BERENSON1.DOC 5/2/2005  8:59:42 AM 
810 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:803 
detailed regulatory provisions covering a wide range of possible student 
behaviors, and such codes place a much lesser emphasis on broad moral 
precepts.  Moreover, it is the contention of this article that this state of 
affairs is as it should be, and that the regulatory function of law school 
codes should, of necessity, be emphasized over the aspirational and 
educational functions that such codes may serve.42  Therefore, the term 
“conduct code” will be used throughout the remainder of this article. 
II.  CODES GENERALLY 
Before turning to a more particular focus on law school codes, this 
section of the article will explore some issues that apply to codes 
generally.  Specifically, this section will address the primary functions of 
conduct codes, the key elements of such codes, as well as some 
important issues with regard to the drafting of such codes. 
A.  Functions of Codes 
There are three primary functions of codes as they relate to persons 
bound by them: aspiration, education, and regulation.43  In their 
aspirational aspects, codes set forth the ideals towards which persons 
bound by the codes should strive to achieve.44  Of course, a classic 
example of a code with clear aspirational aspects is the ABA’s Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code).45  Among other 
provisions, the Model Code contains nine Canons which “are statements 
of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of 
professional conduct expected of lawyers . . . .”46  In their educational 
 
 42. See infra Part II.A. 
 43. Mark S. Frankel, Professional Codes: Why, How, and with What Impact, 8 J. BUS. ETHICS 
109, 110-11 (1989).  In their excellent article regarding academic honor codes, DiMatteo & Wiesner 
combine Frankel’s first two categories, aspiration and education, into a single category of 
educational purposes.  DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 57 n.55.  However, the present 
discussion maintains Frankel’s three-part division.  See also Loane Skene, A Legal Perspective on 
Codes of Ethics, in CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 111 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Block 
eds., Melb. U. Press 1996) (discussing aspirational and prescriptive aspects of codes—the latter 
corresponding roughly to Frankel’s regulatory category).  Judith Lichtenberg notes that apart from 
the effect codes may have on those bound by them, codes may also have an “expressive” function 
vis-á-vis those outside of the group bound by the code.  See Judith Lichtenberg, What are Codes of 
Ethics For?, in CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 23-24 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Block 
eds., Melb. U. Press 1996).  Thus, codes may also express to the broader public the ideals and 
values of the group that promulgated the code.  Id. 
 44. Frankel, supra note 43, at 110. 
 45. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1969). 
 46. Id. at Preliminary Statement.  Examples of the Canons include Canon 8: “A Lawyer 
Should Assist in Improving the Legal System  and Canon 9: “A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the 
8
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aspects, codes seek to demonstrate with clarity the type of conduct that 
is prescribed or approved by the code.47  Often, codes accomplish their 
educational aims through the use of examples, commentary, or 
interpretations.48  A good example of codes which have educative 
aspects of this sort are the American Law Institute Restatements of the 
Law.  The individual Restatement provisions include both commentary 
on how to interpret the principle rule and illustrations of how the rule 
applies in practice.49  Finally, in their regulatory aspect, codes may 
include a detailed set of rules set forth to govern the conduct of the 
persons bound by the code.50  As their name implies, the ABA’s Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct provide an example of a code which is 
heavy on regulatory content.51 
B.  Elements of Codes 
In addition to their primary functions, codes of conduct generally 
have three types of elements: prescriptions, sanctions, and procedures.  
Prescriptions include the substance of the code, namely provisions 
setting forth what the persons governed by the code “ought to do or not 
do, or more generally how they ought to comport themselves, or what 
they, or the [group] as a whole, ought to aspire to.”52  Of course, the 
code’s prescriptions can serve any or all of the above-discussed 
functions of the code.  Thus, a code’s prescriptions can have 
aspirational, educative, or regulatory functions.53  And, as will be 
discussed in more detail below, the primary function of any of a code’s 
prescriptions will have a definite impact on the content or manner of 
phrasing a given prescription.54 
Besides prescriptions, codes may incorporate sanctions which apply 
 
Appearance of Professional Impropriety[.]”  The Canons, as well as the other provisions of the 
Model Code are discussed in greater detail below.  See infra at notes 117-43 and accompanying 
text. 
 47. Frankel, supra note 43, at 110. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F (1977). 
 50. Frankel, supra note 43, at 111. 
 51. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2002).  Examples of regulatory 
provisions contained within the Model Rules include Rule 1.6(a): “A lawyer shall not reveal 
confidential information relating to representation of a client . . . ;” and Rule 1.15(a): “A lawyer 
shall hold property of clients . . . separate from the lawyer’s own property.”  Id.  The heavy 
regulatory focus of the Model Rules is discussed in greater detail below.  See infra notes 137-141 
and accompanying text. 
 52. Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 25. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text. 
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when the code’s prescriptions are violated.55  Sanctions are most likely 
to be present to the extent that the code has a regulatory function.56  
Thus, to the extent that a code has an exclusively aspirational or 
educational function, it may not include any sanctions at all; compliance 
may be purely voluntary.57  Finally, to the extent that a code does 
employ some sort of sanctions, it must have a procedural component as 
well, to assure that the sanctions are imposed in a fair and consistent 
manner.  In U.S. public schools, of course, the imposition of sanctions 
and the procedures utilized in doing so may be governed by 
Constitutional requirements of due process.  The application of due 
process principles in the context of academic discipline is discussed 
below.58 
C.  Drafting Issues 
As implied above, some codes incorporate only one of the three 
functions of codes previously discussed.  For example, as also suggested 
above, some codes may be purely aspirational, and therefore, may not 
incorporate any sanctions for failure to live up to the standards set forth 
in the code.  Some of the lawyer “civility” codes adopted during the 
1990s serve as examples of these types of “aspiration only” codes.59  On 
the other hand, many codes combine all three functions in a single code.  
A good example of this is again provided by the ABA Model Code.  The 
Model Code’s Canons,60 as well as its Ethical Considerations,61 
represent the Code’s aspirational function.  On the other hand, the Model 
Code’s Disciplinary Rules represent its regulatory function.  “The 
 
 55. Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 25.  Some of the general categories of sanctions that are 
typically employed by professional codes are as follows: “imposition of a fine; declaration of a 
finding of impropriety; suspension from practice; imposition of conditions of practice; reduction of 
status of practice; removal of the right to practice.”  Ian Freckelton, Enforcement of Ethics, in 
CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS 147 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Block eds., Melb. U. 
Press 1996). 
 56. See Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 26; Frankel, supra note 43, at 111. 
 57. See Raymond Ripple, Student Article, Learning Outside of the Fire: The Need for Civility 
Instruction in Law School, 15 NOTRE DAME J. LEG. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 359, 370 nn.61-62 (2001) 
(discussing lawyer “civility codes”). 
 58. See infra Part VI. 
 59. See supra note 57.  See also discussion infra at notes 86-94 and accompanying text. 
 60. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 61. According to its Preliminary Statement, the Model Code’s Ethical Considerations “are 
aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession 
should strive.”  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1969).  The 
Model Code makes clear that failure to live up to the aspirations set forth in the Ethical 
Considerations should not provide the basis for disciplinary action against the lawyer.  Id. 
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Disciplinary Rules . . . are mandatory in character[] . . . [and] state the 
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being 
subject to disciplinary action.”62  At first glance, the Model Code’s 
educational function is less readily apparent than its aspirational and 
regulatory functions.  This is because none of its three categories of 
provisions, Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules, are 
primarily identified as serving an educational function, with the first two 
serving an aspirational function63 and the latter serving a regulatory 
function.64  However, the Disciplinary Rules are heavily footnoted, and 
often these footnotes provide examples of how the Disciplinary Rules 
have been, and should be, applied.65  Additionally, at least some of the 
Ethical Considerations are intended to “constitute . . . principles upon 
which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations.”66  
Moreover, the Ethical Considerations are also heavily footnoted with 
examples of how the principles stated therein have been, and should be, 
applied.67  Thus, at a minimum, the footnotes and some of the Ethical 
Considerations serve the Model Code’s educational function. 
The primary function of a particular provision of a code will likely 
have a significant impact on the manner in which that provision is 
drafted.  To the extent that the purpose of a particular code provision is 
to state or to foster broad or abstract aspirational ideals and values, it is 
likely that the provision’s language will be similarly broad, general, or 
abstract.68  On the other hand, if the purpose of a code provision is to 
mandate or prescribe certain behavior, then the language must 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. See supra notes 60-61. 
 64. See supra note 62. 
 65. For example, DR 1-102(a)(3) states that “[a] lawyer shall not [e]ngage in illegal conduct 
involving moral turpitude.”  Footnote 13 to that provision then goes on to discuss examples of 
illegal conduct that courts have found amounts to moral turpitude.  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY (1969). 
 66. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1969). 
 67. For example, Ethical Consideration 1-6 states in part that “[l]awyers should be diligent in 
taking steps to see that during a period of disqualification such person is not granted a license or, if 
licensed, is not permitted to practice.”  MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY (1969).  Footnote 
9, which accompanies that statement, cites a case in which a lawyer was compelled by the court to 
demonstrate that his practice during a period of suspension was not “knowing.”  Id. at EC 1-6 n.9 
(citing In re Sherman, 58 Wash.2d 1, 6-7, 354 P.2d 888, 890 (1960), cert. denied 371 U.S. 951, 9 
L.Ed.2d 499, 83 S.Ct. 506 (1963)). 
 68. Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 25-26.  See also Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between 
Standards and Rules: A New Way of Understanding the Differences in Perceptions of Lawyer Codes 
of Conduct Between U.S. and Foreign Lawyers, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1117 (1999); Fred C. 
Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of 
Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 233 (1993). 
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necessarily be more specific.69  Educational provisions, in turn, require 
rather extensive commentary, interpretation, and examples, which 
demonstrate how the code’s other provisions apply in particular 
contexts.70 
At least when we compare aspirational code provisions to 
regulatory ones, the drafting tradeoffs should begin to look familiar to all 
law students and legal academics.  These tradeoffs implicate the 
recurrent contrast between standards and rules.71  Standards provide for 
the application of broad principles or policies to particular fact 
situations.72  Standards give the person applying them the discretion “to 
take into account all relevant factors or the totality of the 
circumstances.”73  By contrast, rules cabin the discretion of the persons 
who apply them.74  The application of the background principle or policy 
is built into the rule itself and yields predetermined results when the fact 
pattern addressed by the rule arises.75 
The various advantages and disadvantages of standards and rules 
apply equally to aspirational and regulatory code provisions.  For 
example, it may only be possible to phrase code provisions that 
encompass broad, aspirational principles as standards.76  This also allows 
flexibility in applying the standards in particular contexts, including 
those that are new and were not anticipated at the time the code was 
drafted.77  Moreover, because the standards are merely aspirational and 
the code drafters presumably would not want to sanction persons for 
failure to live up to those aspirations, it is not a problem that such broad 
standards do not lend themselves well to enforcement through 
disciplinary mechanisms.78  On the other hand, code provisions may be 
stated so broadly as to open them up to charges of undue vagueness or 
meaninglessness.  And the lack of enforceable sanctions for violation of 
such provisions may lead to similar cynicism as to their importance. 
 
 69. Daly, supra note 68, at 1133; Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 26; Zacharias, supra note 68, 
at 244. 
 70. Frankel, supra note 43, at 110. 
 71. Daly, supra note 68, at 1117 nn.1-6 (citing to the wealth of scholarship discussing the 
dichotomy between standards and rules in a variety of legal subject areas). 
 72. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58 
(1992).  See also Daly, supra note 68, at 1123. 
 73. Sullivan, supra note 72, at 59. 
 74. Id. at 58.  Daly, supra note 68, at 1123. 
 75. Sullivan, supra note 72, at 58.  Daly, supra note 68, at 1123. 
 76. See Charles Frankel, The Code of Professional Responsibility, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 874, 
879 (1976) (book review) [hereinafter Charles Frankel, The Code]. 
 77. See supra note 73. 
 78. See Charles Frankel, The Code, supra note 76, at 879-80. 
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Rules, by contrast, in giving detailed notice of conduct that is 
prohibited or mandated, may do a better job of actually controlling such 
conduct and may form a more appropriate basis for coercive sanctions 
for violation of the rule.  On the other hand, rules are often necessarily 
over or under inclusive.79  Thus, some inappropriate conduct will not be 
addressed merely because the code drafters did not think of it at the time 
the rules were drafted.80  On the other hand, some conduct, which may 
seem excusable given the circumstances, will nonetheless fall within a 
rule’s formal prescriptions.  Additionally, by turning application of the 
rules from an exercise in moral reasoning to one of relatively rote 
application, the code’s educational and aspirational objectives may be 
inhibited.81 
A final point along these lines is that in codes where the three 
possible functions (aspirational, educational, and regulatory) are 
combined, the necessary contrast in provision language (rules and 
standards) may cause its own inherent tension.  A good example of this 
may be provided by what is perhaps the best known of all student 
conduct codes, that of the United States Military Academy (USMA).  
Even as amended, the formal USMA code consists of merely thirteen 
words.82  However, despite this extremely broad, perhaps aspirational 
standard, the code is embedded within a complex, multi-layered “honor 
system,” which includes extensive regulations that provide a multitude 
of narrow rules to supplement the code itself.83  At least one set of 
commentators has noted that the presence of the regulations has tended 
to replace students’ moral reasoning regarding the code’s application 
with a narrow focus on what is or is not permitted by the rules.84  
Another commentator has lamented that the regulations have tended to 
“obscure the spirit of the code and exacerbate the conflict. . . 
between . . . [broader notions of] honor and the regulations.”85 
 
 79. Sullivan, supra note 72, at 58. 
 80. See Vincent R. Johnson, The Virtues and Limits of Codes in Legal Ethics, 14 NOTRE 
DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’L 25, 42 (2000). 
 81. David Luban and Michael Milleman have referred to legal ethics codes evolution from 
standards to rules in terms of the “de-moralization” of legal ethics.  Luban & Milleman, supra note 
9, at 41.  See also Johnson, supra note 80, at 37. 
 82. See supra note 34. 
 83. DiMatteo & Weisner, supra note 11, at 56-57.  In addition to the code and regulations, the 
honor system includes educational programs regarding the code’s implementation.  Id. at 56 (citing 
Beasley, supra note 34, at 187).  Of course, to the extent that the code language itself represents the 
aspirational function of the USMA code and the regulations represent the regulatory function, the 
education programs necessarily represent the system’s educational function.  Id. 
 84. Id. at 57. 
 85. Id. (quoting Beasley, supra note 34, at 193). 
13
Berenson: What Should Law School Student Conduct Codes Do?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
BERENSON1.DOC 5/2/2005  8:59:42 AM 
816 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:803 
Another example may lie with respect to some of the attorney 
civility codes adopted during the 1990s.86  Beginning in the 1980s, in 
response to perceived crises with regard to both the broader issue of 
attorney professionalism87 and the narrower issue of attorney civility,88 a 
number of jurisdictions adopted “civility” codes: sets of provisions 
designed to increase civility in the practice of law.89  Here, a distinction 
must be drawn between the relatively short and broadly stated honor or 
 
 86. A detailed analysis of the movement toward civility codes in legal practice is beyond the 
scope of this article—the following summary will suffice for present purposes.  However, a number 
of detailed and useful analyses of civility codes and the “civility movement” have been written.  
See, e.g., Adam Owen Gilst, Enforcing Courtesy: Default Judgments and the Civility Movement, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 757 (2000); Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility 
Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 657 (1994); Austin Sarat, Enactments of 
Professionalism: A Study of Judges’ and Lawyers’ Accounts of Ethics and Civility in Litigation, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 809 (1998); Brenda Smith, Comment, Civility Codes: The Newest Weapons in 
the “Civil” War Over Proper Attorney Conduct Regulations Miss Their Mark, 24 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 151 (1998). 
 87. Former Chief Justice Burger likely began the chorus of voices bemoaning professionalism 
lost.  See Chief Justice Warren W. Burger, remarks at The Midyear Meeting of the American Bar 
Association (Feb. 13-14, 1984), reprinted in 52 U.S.L.W. 2471 (Feb. 28, 1984).  The ABA took up 
Burger’s rallying cry and subsequently issued its own “blueprint” for increasing lawyer 
professionalism.  See ABA Comm’n on Professionalism, ‘. . . In the Spirit of Public Service:’ A 
Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986).  Nonetheless, the 
voices bemoaning the decline in attorney professionalism continued into the next decade.  Though 
overall there were too many to mention, three of the most prominent, which may have caused a 
crescendo in what one might call the declination view, were MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION 
UNDER LAWYERS (Ferrar, Straus and Giroux 1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: 
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (Harvard Univ. Press 1993); and SOL M. LINOWITZ & 
MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1994). 
 88. Unfortunately, some discussions of these issues have improperly used these terms 
interchangeably.  See Ripple, supra note 57, at 360.  For present purposes, the term civility will be 
used to refer to “the act of treating other people with courtesy, dignity, and kindness.”  Id. at 359.  
On the other hand, the term professionalism will be used to refer to a range of issues in the delivery 
of legal services that relate to the following elements, which are essential components of a 
definition of a profession: 1) performance for public good; 2) special knowledge and training 
requirements; 3) special vulnerability or dependency of the profession’s clients on the particular 
member of the profession performing the professional service; and 4) self regulation.  See, e.g.,  
Robert K. Fullinwider, Professional Codes and Moral Understanding, in CODES OF ETHICS AND 
THE PROFESSIONS 72,73 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Block eds., Melb. U. Press 1996); Russell G. 
Pearce, The Professional Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve the 
Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1240 (1995). 
 89. The best known such code was that adopted by the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, Final 
Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit (1992), reprinted in 143 
F.R.D. 441 (1992) (hereinafter Final Report), which served as a model for many subsequent codes.  
See Christopher J. Pizzola, Comment, Ethical Versus Procedural Approaches to Civility: Why 
Ethics 2000 Should Have Adopted a Civility Rule, 74 U. COL. L. REV. 1197, 1216 (2003).  Indeed, 
in the three years following the Seventh Circuit’s action, more than 100 other jurisdictions adopted 
similar codes.  Id. at 1216 n.114 (citing Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter’s Commentary on the 
Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 278 n.74 (1995)). 
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civility oaths or pledges adopted in some jurisdictions90 and the much 
more detailed civility codes adopted in others.91  Though the purposes of 
both varieties of such codes were stated as being broadly aspirational,92 
for example, to get attorneys to treat each other and other persons 
involved with the legal system with dignity and respect, the means 
chosen to achieve such ends were very different.  And in the case of the 
more detailed codes, provisions adopted have many of the hallmarks of 
rules; they are “highly mechanical, technical, and context-specific.”93  
Indeed, critics of such an approach contend that the rule-like form of 
such provisions have prevented them from achieving their broadly 
aspirational objectives, by among other reasons, discouraging ethical 
deliberation about the rules and allowing the rules themselves to be used 
in an offensive manner inconsistent with the purposes behind the 
codes.94 
Regardless of how one feels about the effectiveness of the USMA 
code or the attorney civility codes discussed above, these examples serve 
to reinforce the point that code drafters have difficult choices to make 
regarding the nature of the language and provisions to include in the 
code and tensions that may be created by incorporating different types of 
provisions, with perhaps different purposes, in the same code. 
III.  SHOULD ACADEMIC CODES DIFFER FROM PROFESSIONAL CODES? 
The foregoing discussion is based primarily on literature dealing 
with professional codes.95  And while there are many similarities, 
 
 90. See, e.g., Creed of Professionalism, FLABAR ONLINE, at http://www.thefloridabar.org 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2005).  See also Smith, supra note 86, at 160-61 & n.73. 
 91. The Seventh Circuit’s Code falls into this category: the final version contains over 50 
separate rules, stated in terms of ethical imperatives and procedural rules.  Pizzola, supra note 89, at 
1217.  See also Smith, supra note 86, at 160 & n.70.  Smith also identifies “combination codes,” 
which contain attributes of both types of codes.  Id. at 160 & nn.71-72. 
 92. See Ripple, supra note 57, at 360 & n.7; Final Report, supra note 89, at 448.  Indeed, 
compliance with many such codes was purely voluntary.  On the other hand, a few such codes were 
mandatory.  See Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 287-88 
(N.D. Tex. 1988) (adopting mandatory civility code for Northern District of Texas).  Additionally, a 
number of courts, relying on their inherent authority to regulate the conduct of lawyers that appear 
before the court, have nonetheless imposed sanctions on lawyers for violating various aspects of 
such civility codes, even where compliance with such codes was intended to be purely voluntary.  
See James E. Moliterno, Lawyer Creeds and Moral Seismography, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 781, 
797 & n.127 (1997); Ripple, supra note 57, at 370-71 & nn.63-66; Smith, supra note 86, at 167-69. 
 93. Pizzola, supra note 89, at 1217. 
 94. Id. at 1216-17; Moliterno, supra note 92, at 796; Smith, supra note 86, at 167. 
 95. Of course, the question of what is a profession has received a great deal of discussion, and 
remains controversial.  See, e.g., Pearce, supra note 88, at 1229.  For present purposes, what are 
considered to be the key elements of a profession are set forth at note 88, supra. 
15
Berenson: What Should Law School Student Conduct Codes Do?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
BERENSON1.DOC 5/2/2005  8:59:42 AM 
818 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:803 
naturally, the objectives of professional codes vary somewhat from the 
objectives of academic codes.96  At a minimum, professional codes seek 
to encourage members of the profession to act, or to refrain from acting, 
in certain prescribed ways.97  Professional codes also may set 
aspirational standards for the profession as a whole, as well as for 
individual members of the profession to strive towards.98  Additionally, 
professional codes may provide a basis for moral deliberation with 
regard to professional decision making.99  Professional codes have an 
expressive function, communicating to the general public the ideals and 
values of the profession,100 helping to establish expectations on the part 
of the public for their dealings with members of the professional 
group,101 and demonstrating to the public that the profession has engaged 
in its self-regulatory function in good faith.102  From a negative 
perspective however, professional codes have been criticized as 
primarily advancing the self-interests of the profession and its members, 
through such devices as barriers to entry and other competition reducing 
means.103 
Given the different objectives of the academic enterprise, one 
would naturally expect some differences from professional codes when 
attention is turned to academic codes.  For example, one would expect to 
see a greater emphasis on the educational function of codes in academic 
versus professional codes.  Indeed, many academic codes explicitly 
recognize their educational function.104  Additionally, academic codes 
seek to foster an environment that provides for fair academic 
competition and preserves the institution’s academic integrity.105  
Academic codes also seek to instill personal values in the students 
governed by them such as “honesty, integrity, individual responsibility, 
 
 96. Mark Frankel sets out the following list of professional code functions: 1) enabling 
document; 2) source of public evaluation; 3) professional socialization; 4) enhance profession’s 
reputation and public trust; 5) preserve entrenched professional biases; 6) deterrent to unethical 
behavior; 7) support system; and 8) adjudication.  Frankel, supra note 43, at 111-12. 
 97. Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 27. 
 98. Freckelton, supra note 55, at 130, 131. 
 99. Margaret M. Coady, The Moral Domain of Professionals, in CODES OF ETHICS AND THE 
PROFESSIONS 28, 50 (Margaret Coady & Sidney Block eds., Melb. U. Press 1996). 
 100. Id. at 48.  See also Johnson, supra note 80, at 38; Lichtenberg, supra note 43, at 23-24. 
 101. Frankel, supra note 43, at 111. 
 102. See supra note 88. 
 103. See, e.g., Fullinwider, supra note 88, at 84; Skene, supra note 43, at 111; CHARLES W. 
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 48 (West Pub. Co. 1986). 
 104. See Sarah Ann Bassler, Article, Public Access to Law School Honor Code Proceedings, 
15 NOTRE DAME J. LEG. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 207, 211 (2001). 
 105. DiMatteo & Weisner, supra note 11, at 55 n.42. 
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respect, trust, and fairness.”106  Naturally, academic codes also identify 
particular acts and practices that students are not permitted to engage in 
and define procedures for determining whether the code has been 
violated and what sanctions may be appropriate for such violations.107  
In any event, the possible distinctions between academic and 
professional codes should be kept in mind in attempting to determine the 
appropriate purposes and content of a law school code. 
IV.  SHOULD LAW SCHOOL CODES DIFFER FROM OTHER ACADEMIC 
CODES? 
Before launching into a discussion regarding the appropriate 
content of law school codes, a number of questions must be answered.  
First, are there distinctions between undergraduate and graduate 
education that should be reflected in the student conduct codes 
applicable at each of the different educational levels?  Second, are there 
distinctions between graduate professional education and other types of 
graduate education that should be reflected in the student conduct codes 
applicable to each?  Third, what should the impact be of the fact that, at 
least with regard to the legal profession, there is in existence a code of 
conduct that governs the profession, and indeed has been a long tradition 
of such codes?  Finally, procedures under law school codes will be 
examined in this Part. 
A.  Graduate v. Undergraduate Education 
Perhaps the fact that legal education is a form of graduate education 
in this country, as opposed to undergraduate education,108 should have 
an impact on the content of the applicable code of student conduct.  For 
example, we would expect students at the graduate level, as a result of 
their greater age, educational, and life experiences, to have obtained a 
higher level of moral reasoning than undergraduate students.109  For this 
 
 106. Carlos, supra note 10, at 940 (citations omitted).  See also Bassler, supra note 104, at 210. 
 107. See Jason J. Bach, Students Have Rights Too: The Drafting of Student Conduct Codes, 
2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 1, 1. 
 108. This, of course, is not necessarily the case throughout the rest of the world.  For example, 
in Europe, formal legal education begins at the undergraduate level.  See Daly, supra note 68, at 
1145. 
 109. See generally Maury Landsman & Steven P. McNeel, Moral Judgment of Law Students 
Across Three Years’ Influences of Gender, Political Ideology, and Interest in Altruistic Law 
Practice, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 891, 901 (2004); Thomas E. Willging & Thomas G. Dunn, The Moral 
Development of the Law Student, 31 J. LEG. EDUC. 306 (1982) (applying Lawrence Kohlberg’s 
theory of moral reasoning development to law students). 
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reason, it may be that the aspirational and educational aspects of a code 
of conduct are less important at the graduate level than at the 
undergraduate level.  Similarly, one would expect that by the time they 
get to graduate school, most students have obtained a basic 
understanding of many of the types of substantive conduct generally 
prescribed by student codes, such as cheating on exams, plagiarism, and 
improper collaboration.110  This fact also seems to point toward a 
reduced emphasis on the aspirational and educational functions of 
graduate student conduct codes.  There is also reason for skepticism 
regarding how much impact graduate education can have on the moral 
character of students.111  Indeed, what little empirical evidence exists 
suggests that, at least to date, law school has had very little impact on the 
moral development of law students.112  All of these facts seem to point in 
the direction of a greater regulatory emphasis for an academic code at 
the graduate level. 
B.  Graduate Professional Education Versus Other Types of Graduate 
Education 
Another issue to consider is whether differences between graduate 
professional education and other forms of graduate education, for 
example masters or doctoral programs in the humanities, arts, or 
sciences, ought to have an impact on the content of student conduct 
codes.  It may be the case that particular professions possess specific 
values or adhere to particular principles that ought to be embodied in the 
student codes applicable to graduate students training to become 
members of a given profession.113  Indeed, many law school codes 
expressly state training in the values of the profession as one of their 
objectives.114  Additionally, one of the key features that often 
 
 110. This is not to deny that some of these concepts have particular and perhaps unfamiliar 
applications in specific graduate educational contexts.  For example, conventions regarding citation 
to authority in the legal education and practice context certainly provide applications of plagiarism 
principles that are likely to be completely unfamiliar to many new law students. 
 111. See Integrity, supra note 7, at 341-42. 
 112. See Mark Neal Aaronson, Be Just to One Another: Preliminary Thoughts on Civility, 
Moral Character, and Professionalism, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 113, 124-25 (1995) (citing studies).  
Despite this empirical evidence, Aaronson remains optimistic that improved pedagogy might result 
in at least small improvement in the moral reasoning abilities of law students, at least vis-á-vis their 
roles as attorneys.  Id. at 125-26. 
 113. See Carlos, supra note 10, at 941 (quoting language from the code of the Kellogg 
Graduate School of Management indicating a purpose of the code to instill core values of the 
“practice and profession” of management in its students). 
 114. See Bassler, supra note 104, at 211-12. 
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distinguishes professions from other occupations is the existence of a 
code of conduct that governs practice of the profession.115  It may be the 
case that a particular relationship between a profession’s code of conduct 
and the code applicable to students studying to join the profession is 
warranted.  Indeed, a number of law school conduct codes specifically 
incorporate the applicable professional code, making those standards 
binding on law students for purposes of academic discipline.116  These 
are also facts that should be kept in mind in the drafting of a law school 
code. 
C.  Codes and the Legal Profession 
Given the importance of its code of ethics to the legal profession, as 
well as the fact that some law school conduct codes presently 
incorporate their jurisdiction’s applicable code, it is worth reflecting on 
developments regarding the evolution of the American legal profession’s 
code of conduct and what implications those developments might have 
for law school codes.  As discussed in greater detail above, the ABA’s 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility incorporated all three 
possible functions of a code: aspiration; education; and regulation.  
Indeed, the sometimes uneasy relationship between these functions is a 
ground for criticism of the code.117  In any event, the Model Code 
represents merely a middle point in the development of codes of ethics 
for the American legal profession.118 
The first formal code of conduct intended to apply to all lawyers in 
the United States was the ABA’s Canons of Ethics, which were adopted 
in 1908.119  There is little doubt where the Canons fell on the continuum 
 
 115. See generally, CODES OF ETHICS AND THE PROFESSIONS (Margaret Coady & Sidney 
Block eds., Melb. U. Press 1996). 
 116. See, e.g., AMERICAN UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF LAW HONOR CODE art. 1.02, available at 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/studentaffairs/honorcode.pdf, (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); CASE W. 
RES. UNIV. LAW SCH. CODE OF CONDUCT § I.1, available at http://lawwww.cwru.edu/, (last visited 
Dec. 19, 2003); UNIV. OF HAW. WILLIAM S. RICHARDSON SCH. OF LAW DISCIPLINARY RULES art. 
III.A.3, available at http://www.hawaii.edu/law/academic/handbook/discReg.html#ART1, (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
 117. See supra notes 82-94 and accompanying text. 
 118. The following discussion is an extremely truncated description of the history of codes of 
legal ethics in America, but will hopefully be sufficient for present purposes.  More detailed 
descriptions and analyses appear in Daly, supra note 68, at 1125-34; Luban & Milleman, supra note 
9, at 42-53. 
 119. Daly, supra note 68, at 1125.  The State of Alabama adopted the first formal code of legal 
ethics in the United States in 1887.  See Allison Marston, The 1887 Alabama Code, 49 ALA. L. REV. 
471 (1998).  The Alabama Code formed the template for the ABA’s 1908 Canons.  Luban & 
Milliman, supra note 9, at 43.  The precursors to the Alabama Code, in turn, were David Huffman’s 
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of specificity identified above;120 they were broad and abstract 
standards.121  Moreover, the fact that no disciplinary enforcement 
mechanism accompanied the Canons and relatively few states adopted 
the Canons122 lends weight to the Canons’ primarily aspirational 
character.123  However, the Canons’ generality ultimately proved to be 
their undoing.124  The Canons’ broad standards were simply inadequate 
to govern the increasingly diverse and complex activities of the modern 
legal profession.  By the 1960s, it was clear that change was needed.  As 
summarized by Dean Mary Daly: “too much imprecision and discretion 
produced ethical incoherence, or worse, paralysis.  Rules, not standards, 
were needed.”125 
The result was the previously discussed 1969 ABA Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility.126  As indicated above, the Code’s Canons, 
Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules represented an uneasy 
synthesis of rules and standards and a similarly tenuous combination of a 
code’s aspirational, educational, and regulatory functions.127  It is 
doubtless that the Code represented an improvement over the Canons, at 
least in terms of its ability to serve as an instrument governing the 
conduct of modern legal practice.  Nonetheless, dissatisfaction with the 
Code was widespread and its reign short-lived.  While more than sixty 
years passed between adoption of the Canons and the Model Code, the 
Model Code was replaced by the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct in 1983, a mere fourteen years after the Model Code’s 
completion.128 
A number of relatively widely-shared criticisms, which are not 
terribly important to the present discussion, led to the codes 
replacement.129  It also seems likely that tensions between the Code’s 
 
1836 Rules of Professional Deportment, and Judge George Sharswood’s famous 1854 lecture series.  
Id.  Both of these precursors were largely aspirational.  See Moliterno, supra note 92, at 787. 
 120. See supra notes 68-70, and accompanying text. 
 121. Daly, supra note 68, at 1125-27. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Accord Moliterno, supra note 92, at 790. 
 124. Id. at 792. 
 125. Daly, supra note 68, at 1128. 
 126. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text. 
 127. Daly, supra note 68, at 1127. 
 128. Id. at 1130. 
 129. Mary Daly identifies three such widespread criticisms.  First, “the Model Code provisions 
were excessively concerned with the dilemmas of the courtroom lawyer and paid little or no 
attention” to issues facing transactional lawyers.  Id.  Second, the Model Code did not anticipate the 
growth of large, mega-law firms with hundreds of lawyers, and the particular issues raised by such 
entities.  Id.  Third, the Model Code did not contain a provision relating to “former client” conflicts 
of interest.  Id.  See also Johnson, supra note 80, at 43. 
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rules and standards, as well as between its various functions,130 created 
at least some impediments to its effective implementation.  Perhaps most 
importantly for present purposes, the changes in the legal profession that 
created the need to move from the Canon’s broad standards to the 
Code’s increased reliance on rules expanded further in the years 
following the Code’s adoption.131  As will be discussed further below,132 
some of the conditions that are often described as being necessary to the 
successful implementation of broad standards (as opposed to rules) are 
relatively small, homogenous communities with widely shared 
experiences and values among the members.133  However, growth and 
diversity of the lawyer population,134 the increasingly interstate and 
international character of legal practice,135 and changes in law firm size, 
structure, and culture,136 all continued to push in the opposite direction.  
Thus, a further need to move along the continuum of codification from 
standards to rules was perceived and led to the replacement of the Model 
Code. 
As their name implies, adoption of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct represented a further step in the movement of the code 
governing the legal profession from standards to rules.137  While there 
remain a number of standards sprinkled throughout the Model Rules as a 
whole,138 the overwhelming balance of the Model Rules is in favor of 
strict legal rules rather than standards.139  The views of the Reporter for 
the Model Rules in this regard are instructive.  According to Yale law 
professor Geoffrey Hazard, “[i]t is time that lawyers and the organized 
bar came to understand that they are governed by law, bound by law, 
and answerable before the law, like other people.”140  Another important 
recent event in the “legalization” of American legal ethics was the 
 
 130. See supra notes 82-94, and accompanying text. 
 131. Daly, supra note 68, at 1130-32. 
 132. See infra notes 152-55, and accompanying text. 
 133. See Daly, supra note 68, at 1125-26. 
 134. Id. at 1131; Johnson, supra note 80, at 34-35. 
 135. Daly, supra note 68, at 1131 & n.78. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 45; THOMAS L. SHAFFER AND MARY M. 
SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 7-8 
(Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1991). 
 138. See Daly, supra note 68, at 1133-34; Samual J. Levine, Taking Ethics Codes Seriously: 
Broad Ethics Provisions and Unenumerated Ethical Obligations in a Comparative Hermeneutic 
Framework, 77 TULANE L. REV. 527, 528-29 (2003); Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 665, 668 (2001). 
 139. Daly, supra note 68, at 1134. 
 140. Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 46 (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rules of Legal 
Ethics: The Drafting Task, REC. BAR CITY N.Y. 77, 84 (March 1981)). 
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completion of the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Restatement of the 
Law Governing Lawyers (Third).141  Of course, the modus operandi of 
the Restatement project is to synthesize existing decisional law into 
concise legal rules. 
As a normative matter, whether the above-described legalization of 
the code of ethics governing lawyers has been a positive or negative 
development is quite controversial.142  However, as a descriptive matter, 
the codes’ movement governing lawyer conduct from standards to rules 
is indisputable.143  In any event, the purpose in reiterating the above-
described developments here is not to weigh in on the merits of the 
controversy, but rather to raise the question of the implications these 
developments may have regarding the appropriate content of law school 
conduct codes.  First, to the extent that one of the primary goals of legal 
education is to train students for the practice of law, a subsidiary of that 
goal might be to train students to conduct themselves in accordance with 
the relevant professional code.  And it may be the case that one way to 
do that is to have students conduct their academic career pursuant to a 
law school code that is similar in form and content to the corresponding 
professional code.  Additionally, to the extent that the present code 
embodies the primary ideals and values of the profession, it may be the 
case that a similar code for law students might also properly incorporate 
the profession’s most important ideals and values. 
D.  Procedures Under Law School Codes 
As stated above, it may be helpful to the training of future lawyers 
to have a law school code that is similar in form and content to that 
which governs the profession.  Similarly, to the extent that certain 
procedures are important in the practice of law, it may be beneficial to 
give students experience in those procedures by incorporating similar 
procedures into a school’s conduct code.  For example, many law school 
codes incorporate full blown adversary proceedings as a means toward 
final determination of charges of code violations.  Often, students play 
major roles in such proceedings, including serving as prosecuting and 
defense counsel, as well as serving as members of the deciding judicial 
panel.  Such students may gain a great deal of valuable experience as a 
 
 141. American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §1 
(1997).  See Johnson, supra note 80, at 28; Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 51. 
 142. See, e.g., Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 41 (describing the above history as the 
“demoralization” of legal ethics). 
 143. Daly, supra note 68, at 1134; Johnson, supra note 80, at 27; Levine, supra note 138, at 
528; Moliterno, supra note 92, at 787; Zacharias, supra note 68, at 223. 
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result of their participation in such proceedings.  Additionally, to the 
extent that such proceedings are open to other members of the law 
school community,144 they may serve an educational function even for 
those who do not participate directly in the proceedings. 
On the other hand, adversary proceedings have been subject to 
strong criticisms for their failure to serve effectively either a truth 
finding or public education function.145  And it may be the case that 
adversary proceedings are particularly poorly suited to serving the 
aspirational and educational functions of law school conduct codes.  In 
such circumstances, it may be that the objectives of law school conduct 
codes are served better by some sort of less formal means of decision 
making, such as some of the mechanisms included within the modern 
alternative dispute resolution movement.  However, while such forms of 
ADR are finding increasing acceptance within the legal community, they 
still remain, as their name implies, an alternative to traditional adversary 
proceedings.  As such, the question becomes whether, in order to have 
the appropriate educative effect, procedures under law school conduct 
codes should mirror the most widespread, or the “best” practices in 
effect in the legal community, or whether there is even a difference 
between the two in the present context. 
V.  PRIORITIZING AMONG POSSIBLE FUNCTIONS OF A LAW SCHOOL 
CODE 
Given the tensions that arise from trying to accommodate different 
functions within the same code, it seems advisable to prioritize among 
the possible functions of a law school code.  As argued below, a law 
school code’s regulatory function should be its priority, followed by its 
educational function.  A law school code’s aspirational objectives should 
necessarily be of a lower priority. 
A.  Regulation 
Naturally, it is difficult to arrive at a single, overriding purpose for 
law school codes when the overall purpose of legal education itself 
remains subject to debate.146  Whether one perceives the primary 
 
 144. The question of whether such proceedings should be open or closed is discussed in greater 
detail below.  See infra notes 250-58 and accompanying text.  See also Bassler, supra note 104, at 
207. 
 145. See discussion infra at notes 232-33, and accompanying text. 
 146. See Bethany Rubin Henderson, Asking the Lost Question: What is the Purpose of Law 
School?, 53 J. LEG. EDUC. 48, 48 (2003). 
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purpose of legal education to be to train future legal practitioners, to 
develop the critical reasoning faculties of law students, or to groom 
future participants in democratic governance, for reasons discussed both 
above and below, there is cause to be skeptical that law school conduct 
codes will play a central role in that function.  On the other hand, law 
school codes may very effectively support one of the other undeniable, if 
less admirable functions of legal education, namely, sorting graduates 
for their future roles in the legal profession.147  A regulatory regime that 
underlies a system of fair academic competition is absolutely essential to 
the validity of a school’s ability to carry out effectively its sorting 
function.  Of course, a regulatory system that ensures the integrity of 
testing and other evaluative tools is also likely to have the effect of 
enhancing some of the more salutary learning goals of the law school 
mentioned above. 
There are additional reasons for adopting effective regulation as the 
primary value to be served by law school codes.  First, as legal 
academics, we likely are confident in our ability to draw relatively 
effective regulatory codes, whereas, the ability of codes to serve their 
other stated functions effectively remains highly controversial.148  
Second, a regulatory approach is most consistent with the type of code 
presently employed by the profession.149  For reasons suggested above, 
this similarity may aid the school in its function of training students for 
effective participation in the profession.  Moreover, training students to 
address the kind of ethical issues that they are likely to encounter in the 
practice of law requires training in dealing with problems in the context 
that they are likely to encounter in the practice of law,150 rather than the 
context in which ethical problems arise in academia.  Finally, a 
regulatory approach seems most consistent with the propositions that 
students have a pretty good general sense of right and wrong by the time 
that they get to law school and a fairly sophisticated understanding of the 
conduct that is permitted and prohibited in an academic setting.151  Thus, 
there may little need for additional education or aspiration along these 
lines in a law school code. 
 
 147. See Richard A. Ippolito, The Sorting Function: Evidence from Law School, 51 J. LEG. 
EDUC. 533 (2001). 
 148. See infra notes 152-67, 174-75, and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra Part IV.C. 
 150. See Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 40-41. 
 151. See supra notes 109-10, and accompanying text. 
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B.  Aspiration 
Unfortunately, there is less reason to be optimistic that a law school 
code can accomplish broadly aspirational objectives.  This is true for a 
number of reasons.  First, it is questionable whether general agreement 
could be obtained on a broad set of principles and values that a law 
school code should aspire to.  As mentioned above, such widespread 
agreement on controversial judgments regarding the fundamental 
principles and values is most likely to occur in small homogeneous 
communities.152  At first blush, it may seem like certain law schools 
satisfy the criteria of being small and homogeneous communities.  
However, as the profession itself is becoming increasingly diverse,153 the 
same is true of law schools.154  Just as the effort to agree on a set of 
broadly stated aspirations for the profession became outmoded in the 
context of the codes governing the profession,155 the effort is likely to 
meet a similar end in the context of law school codes. 
Second, even to the extent that agreement could be reached on a set 
of fundamental principles and values that should be aspired to in a law 
school code, it is likely that such aspirations would have to be stated at 
such a high level of generality that they would undermine the regulatory 
purposes of the code.156  In general, at least two conditions are necessary 
for successful regulatory implementation of broadly worded standards.  
The first is a publicly available set of interpretations of the standard.  Of 
course, published judicial decisions serve this function with regard to 
statutes, regulations, and common law rules that take the form of broadly 
stated standards.  These interpretations give content and meaning to the 
standard and cure the problems created by the vagueness of the language 
of the standard itself.  Additionally, standards can only be effective 
regulatory measures if there is some sort of precedent system so that the 
previously mentioned decisions are somehow binding upon subsequent 
decision makers.  Otherwise, the decisions lose their ability to give 
notice of the meaning of the standards.  Again, such a system of 
precedent (stare decisis) applies with regard to the judicial 
interpretations of the types of standards mentioned above.  It is far from 
 
 152. See supra notes 132-33.  See also Wendel, supra note 32, at 1579. 
 153. See supra note 134, and accompanying text. 
 154. See Henderson, supra note 146, at 50.  Indeed, as Berger and Berger point out in their 
study of academic codes generally, “[f]ew students would think of their school, as they would think 
of their fraternity or church, as a closely-knit membership body to which they belong.”  Berger & 
Berger, supra note 16, at 314. 
 155. See supra note 125, and accompanying text.  See also Johnson, supra note 80, at 35-36. 
 156. See supra note 124, and accompanying text. 
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clear, however, that either of these conditions apply in the context of law 
school codes.  First, as will be discussed in greater detail below, most 
law school codes do not provide for published decisions in individual 
cases.157  Additionally, it is also rarely the case that prior decisions under 
law school codes provide any sort of binding precedent for future 
decision makers under the code.158  While these conditions could be 
changed,159 at the present time they provide strong impediments to the 
ability of law school codes to serve an aspirational function. 
Finally, there is reason to be skeptical of codes’ general ability to 
serve as a tool for effectively serving broadly aspirational objectives.  
Here, it is again useful to turn to the example of civility codes in legal 
practice.  For reasons discussed above, many view the more detailed 
versions of such civility codes as a failure due to the tension between 
their detailed, technical and mandatory language, and their broad 
aspirations.160 Additionally, even with the more broadly stated honor 
oaths or creeds that were adopted,161 a number of factors have served to 
undermine their effectiveness.  First, disagreement exists regarding the 
fundamental purposes to be served by such codes.162  Second, the 
language of such codes in many cases is so broad, it is virtually 
meaningless.163  Third, such codes may cause confusion to the extent 
that they overlap with the provisions of existing codes such as the Model 
Rules.164  Fourth, the lack of meaningful sanctions for violation of such 
codes likely lead many, if not most, attorneys to ignore them.165  
Additionally, whether one agrees with these criticisms or not, it is hard 
to argue that civility codes have had a major impact on the practice of 
law.166  There are simply too many other factors that influence attorney 
behavior for such non-binding, aspirational standards to have much 
 
 157. See infra notes 264-66, and accompanying text. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Indeed I will advocate for such changes below. 
 160. See supra notes 93-94, and accompanying text. 
 161. See supra note 90. 
 162. See Mashburn, supra note 86, at 657 (arguing that civility codes maintain traditional 
hierarchies within the legal profession); Smith, supra note 86, at 151; Monroe Freedman, Kinder, 
Gentler, But Not So Zealous, THE RECORDER, Aug. 23, 1995, at 8 (explaining how the application 
of aspirational creeds undermines zealous representation of clients). 
 163. See Aaronson, supra note 112, at 114 & n.3. 
 164. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Civility Code May Lead to Less Civility, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 
26, 1990, at 13.  See also Moliterno, supra note 92, at 800; Smith, supra note 86, at 162-65. 
 165. See Aaronson, supra note 112, at 114-15.  On the other hand, enforcement may equally 
defeat the purposes of aspirational codes.  Moliterno, supra note 92, at 801. 
 166. See Aaronson, supra note 112, at 113; Johnson, supra note 80, at 45; Smith, supra note 
86, at 153. 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss4/8
BERENSON1.DOC 5/2/2005  8:59:42 AM 
2005] WHAT SHOULD LAW SCHOOL STUDENT CONDUCT CODES DO? 829 
impact.167 
The foregoing rather bleak analysis, however, should not lead to the 
abandonment of all forms of aspiration from law school codes.  Rather, 
perhaps the best approach is to separate such aspirations from the 
regulatory code of conduct itself and present them independently in the 
form of an honor oath or pledge that compliments, rather than competes 
with the regulatory aspects of the code.  In addition to their presence in 
the legal profession,168 such separate honor oaths or pledges are in use at 
a number of academic institutions.169  Such oaths or pledges may indeed 
have some psychological effectiveness in instilling the fundamental 
values of the relevant professional or institutional group in the members 
who take the oath.170  Moreover, because the language of such oaths 
does not appear side by side with the provisions of the regulatory code, 
the problem created by the tension between the oath’s broad, aspirational 
language and the more specific, regulatory language of the code is 
minimized.  This is also the case with regard to a potential conflict 
between the oath’s aspirational language and the sanctions available 
under the code.  The oath or pledge can retain its voluntary character, as 
befits a broad, aspirational standard. 
C.  Education 
Here, we must distinguish between different possible senses in 
which a law school code might serve an educational function.  The first, 
discussed above,171 incorporates concrete examples into the code in 
order to illustrate the code’s provisions.  This seems like a relatively 
modest educational objective and one that would be hard to oppose.  
Concrete examples are likely to be particularly helpful with regard to 
issues such as plagiarism, which, though familiar to students generally, 
take on particular applications in the law school setting.172  Indeed, a 
number of law school codes incorporate examples of this sort.173 
 
 167. Aaronson identifies pressures on attorneys of clients, finances, and time as some such 
factors.  Aaronson, supra note 112, at 116. 
 168. See supra note 90. 
 169. See DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 63-64; Carlos, supra note 10, at 953. 
 170. See Moliterno, supra note 92, at 801 & n.159. 
 171. See supra notes 47-49, and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra note 116, and accompanying text. 
 173. See, e.g., UNIV. OF ALA. LAW STUDENT HONOR CODE ch. 2.d., available at 
http://www.law.ua.edu/students/info.php?re=honorcode (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); ARIZ. ST. UNIV. 
COLL. OF LAW HONOR CODE §3(c), available at http://www.law.asu.edu/Files/StudentResources 
/StudentPolicyManual/HonorCode.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); CAMPBELL UNIV., THE NORMAN 
ADRIAN WIGGINS SCH. OF LAW CODE OF HONOR AND PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY art. III §2 (providing 
27
Berenson: What Should Law School Student Conduct Codes Do?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
BERENSON1.DOC 5/2/2005  8:59:42 AM 
830 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:803 
The second sense in which a law school code might be used for 
educational purposes is as a teaching tool for instilling the moral and 
ethical reasoning skills that we desire law students employ when they 
become legal practitioners.  Here, there is more reason to be skeptical of 
codes’ ability to serve this function.  In order for law school codes to be 
effective teaching tools, law school teachers would in fact need to “teach 
the code.”  In other words, professors would need to incorporate 
teaching the law school code into their traditional classes.  However, my 
sense is that law school codes are seldom if ever taught in this manner at 
present.  Moreover, law school professors are likely to have very little 
appetite for incorporating law school codes into their courses.  
Additionally, even to the extent that professors are willing to incorporate 
law school codes into their teaching, there is reason to question whether 
such codes would be very effective teaching tools for purposes of 
fostering moral and ethical reasoning and analytic skills.  To the extent 
that such codes take the regulatory approach advocated here, teaching 
such codes is likely to face the same criticism that merely teaching the 
professional responsibility rules receives as a means toward advancing 
ethical decision making.174  And, to the extent that codes are more 
aspirational, there is still reason to question whether broadly aspirational 
codes are themselves effective tools for the teaching of the principles 
and values embodied in such codes.175  Finally, there is an increasing 
consensus that effective legal ethics teaching requires situating ethical 
decision making in contexts similar to those in which ethical decision 
making will be undertaken in legal practice.176  However, the academic 
context in which law school conduct codes are applied may be too 
dissimilar from the legal practice context for experience in ethical 
decision making in the former context to translate well to the latter 
context. 
A third sense in which a code might serve an educational function 
involves the extent to which the law school code mirrors the codes that 
will govern students’ conduct in their legal practice careers and/or 
fosters roles within the student conduct system that provide training for 
similar roles students might play in their legal practice careers (such as 
honor court prosecutor, defender or judge).  As indicated above,177 
 
commentary), available at http://law.campbell.edu/Studentlife/honorcode.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 
2005). 
 174. See, e.g., Luban & Milleman, supra note 9, at 39. 
 175. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 176. See generally supra note 9. 
 177. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. 
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persons may differ in opinion as to the value to be served by similarities 
between a law school code and the corresponding professional codes.  In 
any event, even to the extent that one perceives educational value in 
such parallels, students are only likely to receive such benefits to the 
extent of their involvement with the code.  And, as discussed above, 
since few if any professors actually “teach the code,” it is unlikely that 
students will have widespread or extensive contact with the code 
sufficient to foster learning based on its substance. 
By contrast, those students who play important roles in the 
administration of the code are likely to receive significant benefit from 
that experience throughout their practice careers. For example, student 
prosecutors and student defenders may gain valuable trial practice skills 
that will come in handy in their later professional capacities.  Student 
judges may also receive good practice in legal reasoning that will serve 
them well in their future legal careers.  To the extent that student 
disciplinary proceedings are open to the rest of the student body, similar 
educational benefits may be available to those who observe the 
proceedings, although to a much lesser degree than would be the case for 
the actual participants in the proceedings.  Yet a school’s ability to hold 
open disciplinary proceedings may be limited by the provisions of the 
Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),178 which allows for 
the withholding of federal funds from educational institutions which fail 
to preserve the confidentiality of “educational records.”179  On the other 
hand, as will be discussed in greater detail below,180 FERPA’s 
limitations on open disciplinary proceedings may be surmountable.  
Nonetheless, for all of the reasons stated here, it seems reasonable to 
expect only modest educational benefits to flow from a law school 
conduct code. 
VI.  LAW SCHOOL CONDUCT CODES - SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 
In light of the above discussion, it is possible to develop some 
priorities for the drafting of a law school conduct code.  First, the code 
should take, as its overriding priority providing, a clear regulatory 
regime for safeguarding the integrity of the basic academic functions of 
teaching and evaluation.  Next, the code should provide concrete 
examples of how its provisions work, to serve the function of providing 
education regarding the code’s provisions.  The code should also allow 
 
 178. 20 U.S.C.S. §1232g (2002). 
 179. Bach, supra note 107, at 28; Bassler, supra note 104, at 230. 
 180. See infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text. 
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students to play significant roles in the procedures designed to 
administer and enforce the code and provide for as much openness in 
those procedures as is allowable under the law.  Because of the problems 
created by combining broad, aspirational language with narrow 
regulatory language, along with the reasons outlined above, the code 
itself should be devoid of such language.  However, rather than giving 
up entirely on the aspirational function perhaps the best solution is to 
supplement the law school conduct code with a relatively broadly stated 
honor oath or pledge.  The latter would not be enforceable, but would 
embody the highest principles and values to which the law school stands.  
Perhaps recitation of the honor pledge would become a part of the 
orientation experience.  In any event, keeping these priorities in mind, 
attention will now be turned to the substantive and procedural aspects 
that a code serving such priorities would encompass. 
A.  Substance 
In terms of substance, it seems that the heart of a law school 
conduct code should be relatively uncontroversial.  It should include 
provisions prohibiting familiar types of academic misconduct including 
plagiarism, improper collaboration, exam cheating, and unduly 
disruptive behavior.  Two more controversial provisions that might be 
included in a law school code are incorporation of the relevant attorney 
code of professional responsibility and a non-toleration clause.  
Additionally, a code must provide for sanctions in the event of its 
violation. 
1.  Incorporation of Professional Responsibility Code 
Some law school conduct codes incorporate by reference the 
applicable code of attorney professional responsibility in the relevant 
jurisdiction.181  Perhaps the decision whether to include an incorporation 
provision sounds more momentous than it is.  In fact, most of the 
provisions included in an attorney code of professional responsibility 
will have little or no applicability to the law school setting.  Indeed, the 
vast majority of the Rules contained in the Model Rules relate to 
attorney client relationships or conduct undertaken by attorneys on 
behalf of clients.  The only provision of the Model Rules that likely 
would be implicated frequently in a law school discipline context would 
be Rule 8.4(c), which states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a 
 
 181. See supra note 116. 
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lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation . . . .”182  While it seems that this provision alone 
could form the basis for a broadly aspirational code, it also seems that 
only confusion is likely to be spurred by incorporating numerous 
provisions that have no direct application in the law school setting into a 
law school conduct code.  Language similar to that of Rule 8.4(c) could 
be included without incorporating the rest of the Model Rules.  
Nonetheless, doing so would be inconsistent with the priorities identified 
here. 
2.  Non-toleration Clauses 
The issue of a non-toleration clause is likely more controversial.  
Non-toleration clauses require students to report instances of code 
violations by other students, and subjects students who fail to report 
misconduct to sanctions themselves.183  As mentioned above, the Model 
Rules contain a non-toleration clause,184 and indeed such provisions 
have long standing in the legal profession.185  However, non-toleration 
clauses are often unpopular with those governed by them.  Few people 
like to be in the position of “snitch.”186  And the situation may be even 
worse in the academic setting, as students are torn between their loyalty 
to their fellow students and the requirements of the non-toleration 
clause.187 
In his thorough analysis of mandatory reporting provisions in the 
legal profession, Arthur Greenbaum identifies the primary purposes 
served by such non-toleration provisions.188  First, mandatory reporting 
provisions may be a necessary correlate to the self-regulatory aspect of 
lawyer ethics and disciplinary systems.189  Second, mandatory reporting 
requirements may enhance the legal profession’s public image.190  Third, 
 
 182. The Model Rules also include a “non-toleration” clause, which requires attorneys to report 
misconduct by other attorneys.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.3 (2002)  While this 
provision would be relevant in a law school discipline setting, such provisions will be discussed 
below.  See infra notes 183-95 and accompanying text. 
 183. DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 76-77; Carlos, supra note 10, at 960. 
 184. See supra note 182. 
 185. See Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A 
Roadmap for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 261 (2003).  Indeed, all but two states, 
Kentucky and California, have adopted some sort of mandatory reporting requirement.  Id. at 262 
n.9. 
 186. DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 77 n.174. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Greenbaum, supra note 185, at 263-64. 
 189. Id. at 264. 
 190. Id. at 267-68. 
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mandatory reporting may enhance lawyer professionalism.191  Finally, 
mandatory reporting may be justified to the extent that it uncovers 
misconduct more efficiently than other means.192 
Of all of these possible justifications, only the latter seems to apply 
to law school codes.193  With regard to that justification, it does seem 
quite likely that students are in the best position to detect violations of 
the code by classmates, and that student reporting is more likely to lead 
to discovery of code violations than any other source.  The increase in 
the number of violations discovered, however, must be balanced against 
likely widespread disregard for the reporting requirement, for reasons 
stated above.  Then, the question is one of willingness to enforce 
rigorously the requirement.  Indeed, in the legal practice context, bar 
authorities have been unwilling to do so, with only two known cases in 
which a lawyer has been punished for failing to report misconduct by 
another lawyer.194  But while there may be good reasons to have a 
mandatory reporting provision in the legal practice context, even if that 
provision is not going to be rigidly enforced,195 this is unlikely the case 
with regard to an academic code.  Indeed, having a code provision that is 
widely ignored, especially in an area likely to be highly controversial, as 
non-toleration codes are, would only serve to undermine the seriousness 
with which the entire code is taken.  For this reason, I recommend 
against inclusion of a non-toleration provision in a law school code.  Of 
course, this does not mean that students will not be permitted to report 
code violations or indeed encouraged to do so.  Indeed many students 
will see that their own interests are served by efforts to deter misconduct 
by fellow students, and it is expected that most violations will continue 
to be reported by students.  However, students should not themselves be 
subject to discipline for failing to report code violations. 
3.  Sanctions 
A final issue that should be addressed with regard to the substance 
of the code are the sanctions that are available for the code’s violation.  
Typical sanctions include oral or written reprimand, temporary or 
 
 191. Id. at 268-69. 
 192. Id. at 271. 
 193. However, in their analysis of academic codes, DiMatteo & Wiesner analogize students to 
professionals.  See DiMateo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 61.  Given that analogy, some of the 
justifications for non-toleration clauses that relate to notions of professionalism might seem to 
apply.  Indeed, DiMatteo & Wiesner endorse the concept of non-toleration clauses.  Id. at 75-81. 
 194. Greenbaum, supra note 185, at 272-73 & n.65. 
 195. Id. at 274. 
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permanent notation of the violation in the student’s law school record, 
probation, suspension, expulsion, community service, and some impact 
upon the student’s grade in the course in which the misconduct 
occurred.196  Sanctions which relate to students’ grades seem somewhat 
problematic, as they intrude upon what is traditionally regarded the 
province of the course professor to determine students’ grades.  
However, in some cases, it does seem that merely giving no credit on an 
assignment, or reducing a grade, might be an appropriate sanction for 
certain types of misconduct.  The notion of non-permanent or private 
reprimands also raises some questions because in virtually every state in 
the country, both students and law schools are under an obligation to 
report academic misconduct to bar authorities in conjunction with 
application for admission to the bar.197  Thus, even if the notation of the 
violation is removed from the student’s record, the duty to report 
remains.  Naturally, the exact manner in which this plays out depends on 
the specific language employed by bar authorities in framing their 
reporting duty.  For example, in California, bar applicants are required to 
disclose whether they have “ever been dropped, suspended, expelled, or 
otherwise disciplined by any school for any reason other than academic 
performance.”198  This wording seems to require reporting of even the 
mildest of sanctions, adding a degree of severity to the sanctions for 
even minor misconduct.  Of course, it seems unlikely that minor law 
school misconduct would have much of an impact on bar admission; 
whereas, serious misconduct likely should be considered in the bar 
admission process. 
B.  Procedure 
It seems that most of the writing that has been done to date 
regarding academic codes has focused to a large extent on the 
procedures that such codes require in implementing the code’s 
substantive provisions.199  Perhaps this is due in part to the fact that most 
 
 196. See Carlos, supra note 10, at 969. 
 197. Id. at 973-74. 
 198. The Committee of Bar Examiners of the State Bar of California, Office of Admissions, 
Application for Determination of Moral Character, at 13, available at http://calbar.ca. 
gov/calbar/pdfs/admissions/Moral-Character/adm_app_moral-character_1003.pdf (last visited Feb. 
5, 2005). 
 199. See, e.g., Bach, supra note 107, at 12-30; DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 84-96; 
Karla H. Fox, Due Process and Student Academic Misconduct, 25 AM. BUS. L. J. 671 (1988); 
Douglas R. Richmond, Students’ Right to Counsel in University Disciplinary Proceedings, 15 J. 
COLL. & UNIV. L. 289 (1989); Paul Rosenthal, Speak Now: The Accused Student’s Right to Remain 
Silent in Public University Disciplinary Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1241 (1997); Bassler, 
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of the judicial decisions that have reviewed student disciplinary 
proceedings have focused on matters of procedural due process.200  
Because much has already been written on this subject, this article will 
not attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the legal requirements for 
the procedural aspects of academic codes.  Additionally, perhaps not 
surprisingly, law school codes tend to provide at least as much in the 
way of procedural due process protections, as is the case with regard to 
other types of academic codes.201 Also, because, as demonstrated below, 
the legal requirements for the procedural aspects of such codes are in 
fact, extremely minimal, it makes sense to focus more attention on the 
normative question of what the procedural components of a good law 
school code ought to be.  But first, a brief review of the legal landscape. 
Naturally, the first question that must be addressed in determining 
what procedures a law school code must include is whether the law 
school in question is a public or private institution.  This is because there 
is no question that the procedural due process requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution apply to public 
or state sponsored law schools.202  The seminal case that is often cited as 
first recognizing this principle is Dixon v. Alabama,203 in which the Fifth 
Circuit found that students in good standing at a state sponsored 
university had a constitutionally recognized liberty and/or property 
interest in remaining enrolled at the school, and therefore, had a right to 
notice and a hearing before being dismissed.204  The United States 
 
supra note 104, at 215-20; Carlos, supra note 10, at 944-52. 
 200. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Dixon v. Ala. St. Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 
150 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 201. In their article reviewing undergraduate conduct codes, Professors Berger and Berger set 
forth the results of their admittedly “unscientific survey” of such codes regarding the procedural due 
process protections provided to students accused of code violations.  Berger & Berger, supra note 
16, at 297-99.  In writing this article, this author conducted an even more “unscientific” review of 
the conduct codes of 77 of the 188 (slightly more than 40%) ABA approved U.S. law schools.  Id.  
The codes reviewed here were selected on a relatively “random” basis, namely, which schools had 
posted their codes to their school websites in such a manner that they were easily “downloadable” 
by my research assistant.  Id.  It does appear, nonetheless, that the codes reviewed here come from a 
fairly representative cross section of the totality of ABA approved schools.  Id.  And with regard to 
each of the procedural protections surveyed by Berger and Berger, it appears that at least as high a 
percentage of law school codes provide that procedural protection, as was the case with regard to 
the undergraduate codes surveyed by Berger and Berger. Id. 
 202. “. . . nor shall any State deprive a person of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law . . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
 203. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). 
 204. Id. at 157.  The students in Dixon were expelled for conduct relating to efforts to 
desegregate a courthouse lunchroom in Alabama in 1960.  Id. at 152 n.3.  The Court of Appeals 
concluded that the students were expelled without any prior notice of the charges against them or 
hearing whatsoever.  Id. at 154. 
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Supreme Court upheld this notion in the later case of Goss v. Lopez,205 
while at the same time indicating that all the process due to students in 
the public school disciplinary context is “some kind of notice and . . . 
some kind of hearing.”206  While subsequent courts have struggled to 
define the contours of the notice207 and hearing208 requirements imposed 
by the Court, it seems quite clear that the Constitutional standard 
imposes at most very minimal requirements on the drafters of law school 
codes.209 
At first blush it would seem that even fewer procedural due process 
requirements would apply to private law schools, in the absence of the 
state action required to render the Fourteenth Amendment applicable.210  
However, a number of theories have been applied to impose upon 
private schools similar procedural due process requirements to those that 
apply to public schools.  First, it has been argued that because many 
private universities receive federal financial assistance, are heavily 
regulated, and engage in a variety of projects with government entities, 
such universities are “state actors” for purposes of due process analysis.  
However, such arguments have been rejected.211  Students have relied 
more successfully on contract theories to impose procedural due process 
type requirements on private universities.212  Because the relationship 
between student and university is contractual in nature, certain 
 
 205. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).  The liberty interest involved in Goss was to a free public education, 
which the State of Ohio provided for by statute in the circumstances of that case.  Id. at 567. 
 206. Id. at 579.  Goss involved ten-day suspensions from public high schools for students 
involved in a variety of protest activities.  Id. at 569-71.  The students were suspended without any 
prior notice or a hearing regarding the charges against them.  Id. at 568. 
 207. See Jaska v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 597 F. Supp. 1245 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (six weeks’ 
notice of hearing was adequate), aff’d 787 F.2d 590 (6th Cir. 1986); Bleicker v. Bd. of Tr. of Ohio, 
485 F. Supp. 1381 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (refusing preliminary injunction against academic discipline 
even though plaintiff only received three days’ notice of initial hearing). 
 208. See Hagopian v. Knowlton, 470 F.2d 201, 204 (2d Cir. 1972), overruled in part and on 
other grounds by Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) (overruling Second Circuit’s 
determination that preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate where cadet is dismissed from West 
Point Military Academy without procedural due process); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 
812 (2d Cir. 1967); Henderson State Univ. v. Spadoni, 848 S.W.2d 951 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993). 
 209. See, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d 655, 663-64 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating there is no 
right to cross examine witnesses in academic disciplinary hearing); Wasson, 382 F.2d at 812 
(finding there is no right to counsel in academic disciplinary proceeding); Bleicker, 485 F. Supp. at 
1384, 1387 (stating that three days notice of honor code violation was adequate). 
 210. See, e.g., Swanson v. Welsey College, 402 A.2d 401, 403 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979) 
(determining that there is no state action in provision of education by private college). 
 211. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Beilis v. Albany Med. Coll., 525 
N.Y.S.2d 932, 934 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding that state financial assistance does not make 
medical school a “state actor” for constitutional purposes). 
 212. See, e.g., Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 289-94; Carlos, supra note 10, at 943-44. 
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documents, such as student handbooks detailing disciplinary procedures, 
may be viewed as being express parts of the contract between student 
and university.213  In such circumstances, the contract may provide for 
greater214 or lesser due process protections than would be provided under 
the Constitution.215  The law of associations has also been looked to as a 
source of due process type rights for students regarding disciplinary 
proceedings.216  However, in addition to adding legal force to provisions 
already adopted by the school, such theories have at most created a 
prohibition against arbitrary, unreasonable or bad faith discipline of a 
student.217 
An additional distinction must be noted between actions taken 
against students for academic reasons and those taken for disciplinary 
reasons.218  The cases cited in support of the previous discussion deal 
exclusively with sanctions imposed against students for disciplinary type 
violations.  While, as noted above, courts’ review of a school’s actions 
in such circumstances is limited, courts are willing to take a fairly hard 
look to ensure that, at a minimum, the school has followed its own 
adopted procedures for addressing the disciplinary charge.  This is not 
surprising, given the fact that determining whether a school’s quasi-
judicial procedures have been followed, as well as whether the evidence 
presented to the school supports the finding that the alleged misconduct 
occurred, are well within the core competencies of courts of law.  By 
contrast, where the question involved relates to assessments of the 
quality of academic performance, courts are far from their core 
competencies, and the desire to defer to professorial determinations of 
academic performance is great.219  In such circumstances, courts will at 
most review the institution’s decision to dismiss or otherwise sanction a 
student for inadequate academic performance for arbitrariness.220 
 
 213. See, e.g., Cloud v. Tr. of Boston Univ., 720 F.2d 721, 724 (1st Cir. 1983); Slaughter v. 
Brigham Young Univ., 514 F2d 622, 626 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898 (1975); 
Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238 (D. Vt. 1994); Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. 
Supp. 1060, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1977), aff’d, 579 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1978); Harvey v. Palmer Coll. of 
Chiropractic, 363 N.W.2d 443 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 427 N.Y.S.2d 760 
(N.Y. 1980); Beilis, 525 N.Y.S.2d at 933. 
 214. Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 291. 
 215. See Jansen, 440 F. Supp. at 1062. 
 216. Tedeschi, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 764. 
 217. Harvey, 363 N.W.2d at 444.  See also Anderson v. Mass. Inst. Tech., No. 94-0348, 1995 
WL 813188, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 1985). 
 218. Berger & Berger refer to this distinction as being between “academic failure” and 
“academic wrongdoing.”  Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 302. 
 219. Id. 
 220. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222 (1985); Bd. of Curators of 
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In any event, the above discussion makes clear that law schools 
have a great deal of latitude in determining the procedures to be 
employed under their conduct codes.  The following are some 
suggestions for such procedures. 
1.  Notice 
As discussed above, adequate notice of the charges against a person 
is one of the fundamental requirements of due process.221  However, the 
formulation of the notice to give students regarding the alleged violation 
should be relatively uncontroversial, provided it cites to the provisions 
of the code the student is accused of violating and makes some reference 
to the conduct alleged to have violated the code.  Though some 
controversy has surrounded the question of how much notice is enough 
for due process purposes,222 fairness would seem to require at least 
enough notice for a person to be able to prepare adequately for any 
hearing in the matter. 
A perhaps more controversial issue surrounds what access the 
accused student should have to the evidence that will be presented 
against her or him in adjudication of the alleged code violation.  Courts 
have not generally found a right to formal discovery in academic 
disciplinary proceedings unless such a right is provided for in the 
school’s adopted procedures.223  However, discovery is now a hallmark 
of our civil justice system,224 and to the extent that it is desirable that law 
school conduct codes embody similar procedures to those employed in 
legal practice,225 discovery should be made available in law school 
disciplinary proceedings as well.  Additionally, fundamental fairness 
would seem to dictate that the ability to respond effectively to charges 
presented at a hearing would require some advance knowledge of the 
 
the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978); Susan M. v. N.Y. Law Sch., 556 N.E.2d 1104, 
1107 (N.Y. 1990). 
 221. See supra note 206. 
 222. In Goss, the Court used the unfortunate language that “[t]here need be no delay between 
the time ‘notice’ is given and the time of the hearing.”  419 U.S. at 582.  Of course, a literal 
interpretation of that language would eviscerate the notice requirement entirely.  But courts have 
found that relatively minimal notice will be adequate.  See, e.g., Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d at 
661-62 (finding that four days’ notice of hearing was adequate); Bleicker v. Bd. of Tr. of Ohio, 485 
F. Supp. at 1387 (finding that three days’ notice of hearing was adequate). 
 223. See Nash, 812 F.2d at 661-62 (finding no right of accused to access statements of 
witnesses testifying against him at hearing). 
 224. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
 225. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. 
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evidence that the accused will be called upon to respond to.226 
A subsidiary issue regards whether the accused should be informed 
initially of the identity of the person who made the accusation.  While 
the question is likely to be less controversial if a faculty member or other 
officer of the school is involved, it seems like a question of substantial 
significance where, as in a large proportion of cases, the accusation is 
made by a fellow student.  Anonymity is likely to result in a higher 
incidence of reporting, although it might be contended that anonymity 
may lead to frivolous reports.  In any event, in the interests of protecting 
students reporting other students’ misconduct, it seems that anonymity 
should be maintained at least until the disciplinary process moves past a 
preliminary stage.227  However, by the time formal hearing procedures 
are reached, fairness would dictate that the accused need be made aware 
of the evidence against her or him,228 including, the identity of the 
person who made the complaint. 
2.  The Hearing 
Whereas, the above-described cases make clear that some sort of 
hearing must be accorded law school students in conjunction with 
disciplinary proceedings, the specific form of the hearing lies within the 
wide discretion of those drafting the code.229  At one end of the 
 
 226. Virtually all of the commentators on the issue advocate for some opportunity for the 
accused to review the evidence and witnesses that will be presented against them at the hearing on 
the matter.  See, e.g., Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 351; DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, 
at 89; Carlos, supra note 10, at 946-49. 
 227. Some academic codes provide very detailed preliminary investigative procedures to 
determine whether charges of violations of the code should go forward.  Carlos, supra note 10, at 
966 & n.266.  Some even go so far as providing for a “probable cause” hearing, in order to 
determine if a full and final hearing should go forward.  Id. at 966 & n.267.  However, given the 
relative informality that is permitted with regard to the final hearing to be provided in academic 
disciplinary contexts, providing for an additional probable cause hearing seems excessive.  See 
supra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.  Additionally, both the student and the institution have 
an interest in having allegations of misconduct resolved as expeditiously as possible.  See Berger & 
Berger, supra note 16, at 345.  Nonetheless, it does seem perfectly appropriate that some sort of 
preliminary investigation be conducted before an accusation of a code violation goes to a full 
hearing.  No student should be required to go through a full hearing unless it is determined that there 
is some degree of merit to the allegation of wrongdoing.  However, it is this author’s view that 
student prosecutors and their faculty advisor are well suited to make such a “probable cause” 
determination without the need for an additional hearing.  See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying 
text. 
 228. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text. 
 229. In cases involving public schools, courts have sometimes looked to the Supreme Court’s 
now familiar formulation from Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-36 (1976), for determining 
what process is due in cases involving possible deprivations of constitutionally protected liberty or 
property interests.  See, e.g., Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 837 F.2d 7, 13 (1st Cir. 1988); Nash v. 
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continuum of possibilities lies a full-blown trial type proceeding.230  One 
possible advantage of this type of proceeding relates to the educational 
function of the code.  To the extent that law students are likely to be 
involved in trial work in the future, holding similar trials in code 
violation proceedings might help to prepare students for their future 
endeavors.  This would be particularly true for students playing a role in 
such proceedings, such as student prosecutors, defenders, judges or 
courtroom officials.  If such proceedings were open to the student body, 
even those merely observing the proceedings might obtain some 
educational benefit. 
In addition to the educational benefits of full-blown adversarial 
hearings in law school disciplinary contexts, such proceedings might be 
most consistent by placing the priority upon the regulatory function of 
the code.  In other words, to the extent that the primary purpose of a law 
school code is to prevent and punish academic misconduct, full-blown 
trial proceedings might be the most effective way to determine if such 
 
Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d at 660.  Under that formulation, the court is required to balance the 
following factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
[g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 
Id. (quoting Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335).  Applying these standards, courts have come up with a 
flexible approach, that may require more or less formal hearing procedures depending on what is at 
stake for the students involved.  For example, in Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court intimated that a 
more formal hearing might have been required had the students in that case faced suspensions of 
longer than ten days.  419 U.S. at 584.  As one court stated, in the academic discipline context, 
“[f]lexibility and elbow room are to be preferred over specificity.”  DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 
11, at 91 (quoting Henderson State Univ. v. Spadoni, 848 S.W.2d at 953. 
 230. Marin v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. 613 (D.P.R. 1974), represents the high water mark 
for procedural due process protections in the academic discipline context.  Marin involved 
suspension for more than one year of two students who engaged in a variety of protest activities 
regarding the conduct of student elections at the University of Puerto Rico.  Id. at 617-18.  The 
Court ruled that in the circumstances, a constitutionally permissible hearing for the students would 
involve: 
(1) adequate advance notice to the student of (a) the charges, (b) the specific, previously 
promulgated regulations under which the charges are brought, and (c) the evidence 
against the student; (2) a full, expedited evidentiary hearing (a) presided over by an 
impartial, previously uninvolved official, (b) the proceedings of which are transcribed, at 
which the student (c) can present evidence and (d) cross-examine opposing witnesses, (e) 
with the assistance of retained counsel; and (3) a written decision by the presiding 
official encompassing (a) findings of fact, (b) the substantial evidence on which the 
findings rest, and (c) reasons for the conclusion. 
Id. at 623.  As the previous discussion indicates, no other court has been willing to go nearly so far 
as the Marin court in formalizing the hearing procedures required in an academic disciplinary 
context. 
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misconduct has in fact occurred and to determine the appropriate 
sanction in the event that it has.  Of course, whether adversarial 
proceedings are in fact the best way to serve these functions is subject to 
vigorous debate.231  But in any event, it seems likely that students faced 
with serious allegations of academic misconduct with serious potential 
sanctions, up to and including expulsion, are likely to perceive formal, 
trial-like proceedings as fairer than less formal alternatives.  This fact 
also militates in favor of more formal proceedings. 
However, other values implicated in the law school context might 
weigh in favor of proceedings lying much closer to the informal end of 
the continuum of possible types of proceedings.  First, adversary trials 
have been criticized as an ineffective means of determining the “truth” 
about what happened with regard to alleged wrongdoing.232 Yet, it seems 
that the “truth finding” function might be a more important aspect of law 
school disciplinary proceedings than is the case with the typical civil or 
criminal trial.  Secondly, “[s]ome educators . . . view the disciplinary 
process not as a forum to determine guilt or innocence or to impose 
sanctions, but rather as an instructional vehicle allowing students to gain 
wisdom and better judgment from their mistakes.”233  And students may 
be more likely to acknowledge and learn from wrongdoing in a setting 
where the allegations are resolved through a cooperative process, rather 
than in a setting where a resolution is imposed upon the student 
adversarially.  Additionally, given that student misconduct may harm 
other students as well as the institution, and given the importance of 
such student-to-student relationships to the success of the institution, it 
might well be that informal, non-adversarial (or cooperative) resolutions 
of disciplinary charges are more important to the well-being of academic 
institutions than is the case regarding the typical civil or criminal trial. 
Of course, efforts to resolve disputes non-adversarially are not 
necessarily incompatible with the availability of full blown adversarial 
proceedings at some point in the process.234  Indeed, most alternative 
 
 231. See infra note 232. 
 232. Perhaps the most effective version of this critique appears in DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS 
AND JUSTICE 68 (Princeton Univ. Press 1988).  Luban also critiques other justifications for the 
current American version of adversarial trial proceedings, including the protection of individual 
legal rights, id. at 74, and the protection of human dignity.  Id. at 85.  Luban finds all of these 
justifications for the adversary system in its current form to be wanting but in the end approves of 
the adversary system on the “pragmatic” grounds that the system appears to be no worse than the 
other alternatives that might replace it in terms of discovering truth and protecting legal rights, and 
therefore, the transaction costs involved in moving to a new system would not be justified.  Id. at 
92. 
 233. Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 340. 
 234. Though a contrary example is provided by the collaborative divorce movement, in which 
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dispute resolution takes place in a context where trials are ultimately 
available if the cooperative efforts fail.  Due to the educational and 
fairness aspects discussed above in conjunction with formal adversarial 
proceedings, such proceedings should remain available under law school 
codes.  However, a variety of less formal means leading up to such 
proceedings should be employed in an effort to resolve law school 
disciplinary matters cooperatively. 
Two subsidiary issues regarding the scope of the hearing afforded a 
person accused of a code violation which merit brief mention are the 
possible rights of cross-examination and representation by counsel.  Not 
surprisingly, given the limited nature of the due process protections 
available at such hearings, neither “right” has been uniformly held to be 
constitutionally required in the academic disciplinary context.  It has not 
generally been held that there is a right to cross-examination in student 
disciplinary proceedings.235  And while courts have divided over 
whether there is a right to counsel in academic disciplinary proceedings, 
most hold that there is no such right.236  Nonetheless, most 
commentators suggest that both be provided in the academic disciplinary 
context,237 and most law school codes presently provide for such 
rights.238  To the extent that, as suggested above, an appropriate goal of a 
 
the parties to dissolution of marriage proceedings sign an agreement to resolve the matter through 
negotiation and agree to retain new counsel if the collaborative process does not succeed and resort 
is ultimately had to the courts.  See Marsha Baucom, Collaborative Divorce, ORANGE COUNTY 
LAWYER 18 (July 1999). 
 235. See Nash v. Auburn Univ., 812 F.2d at 664. 
 236. Compare Marin v. Univ. of P.R., 377 F. Supp. at 623 (stating that due process requires 
right to counsel), Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (finding same), and 
French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (E.D. La. 1969), appeal dismissed, 425 F.2d 182 (5th 
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 941 (1970) (stating that due process is denied by refusing students 
counsel of their choice), with Henson v. Honor Comm. of U. Va., 719 F.2d 69, 73 (4th Cir. 1983) 
(finding that a law student had no right to counsel in disciplinary proceedings), Rustad v. U.S. Air 
Force, 718 F.2d 348, 350 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding that Air Force Academy cadets have no right to 
counsel in disciplinary proceedings), Madera v. Bd. of Educ., 386 F.2d 778; 780 (2d Cir. 1967) 
(finding no right to counsel), Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d at 812 (finding no right to counsel), 
Due v. Fla. Agric. & Mech. Univ., 233 F.Supp. 396, 403 (N.D. Fla. 1963) (finding no due process 
right to counsel for accused student), and Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228, 236-37 (S.D.W.Va. 
1968) (finding no right to counsel). 
 237. See Bach, supra note 107, at 20 (cross examination) and 23 (right to counsel); Berger & 
Berger, supra note 16, at 338 (right to counsel) and 346 (right to cross examine); DiMatteo & 
Wiesner, supra note 11, at 92 (recommending right to cross-examination); Carlos, supra note 10, at 
949-950 (advocating right to counsel).  But See DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 93 
(suggesting that there is no need for a right to counsel in a “well-structured student-run Honor 
System in which the accused is given notice and a hearing, along with the right to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses . . .”). 
 238. See, e.g., THE DRAKE U. SCH. OF LAW CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT §E.3(f)-(g), 
available at http://www.law.drake.edu/students/codeofstudentconduct.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 
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law school student conduct system is to have a final proceeding that 
closely resembles a full blown trial, it follows that both a right to cross-
examination and a right to counsel should be provided.  However, if 
another goal is to maximize educational potential, as well as substantive 
fairness by having significant student involvement in the system,239 then 
perhaps the default rule should be to provide for student prosecutors and 
defenders, who will generally serve as counsel during the proceedings, 
with the assistance, in preparation at least, of an experienced faculty 
supervisor.  However, given the stakes involved, the accused student 
should also have the right to retain an actual lawyer to represent him/her 
in the proceedings should he/she desire to do so.240 
Another question relating to the hearing provided to students under 
the code is the standard of proof that should be required to find a code 
violation.  Even assuming that student disciplinary proceedings will 
approach typical legal proceedings in terms of formality, there remain a 
number of possible choices regarding the quantum of proof required to 
find a code violation.  Of course, the familiar options are the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard used in criminal proceedings,241 the clear and 
convincing evidence standard utilized in, among other contexts, 
professional licensing disputes,242 civil commitment proceedings,243 and 
 
2003); U. OF MINN. LAW SCH. HONOR CODE §4.06(b)(2)-(3), available at 
http://www.law.umn.edu/current/honor.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); SMU, DEDMAN SCH. OF 
LAW STUDENT CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY § IX(A) & (F), available at 
http://www.law.smu.edu/lawschool/scode.shtm#HEARING (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
 239. Some academic codes provide for, and some commentators advocate for a student conduct 
system that is almost completely student run.  See Carlos, supra note 10, at 957-59 & nn.202-209.  
However, while significant student involvement in the code is essential for educational as well as 
legitimacy and fairness reasons, there are a number of reasons why significant faculty or 
administrative involvement is desirable as well.  First, students may lack the expertise, experience, 
and judgment necessary to adjudicate successfully alleged code violations on their own.  Second, 
given students’ limited temporal relationship to the institution, professional involvement is 
necessary to ensure that long term institutional interests are protected.  Along similar lines, if 
student conduct systems are to adopt the type of precedential system that is advocated below, then 
some limitation on turnover of personnel within the system will be desirable.  See infra notes 264-
66 and accompanying text.  Finally, professors and administrators also often have a large stake in 
the outcome of student conduct code proceedings.  Thus, what is advocated here is a hybrid system, 
which includes significant involvement in the code by both students and professionals within the 
institution. 
 240. Though some commentators decry the imbalance created by a situation where student 
prosecutors are opposed by actual defense attorneys, see Carlos, supra note 10, at 951, of course 
providing such “advantages” for defendants is a hallmark of our criminal justice system and is not 
out of place in an academic disciplinary proceeding where the consequences to the accused if 
convicted may be similarly grave. 
 241. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 358-59 (1970). 
 242. See, e.g., ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, Rule 18(c) 
(1996). 
42
Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 8
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol38/iss4/8
BERENSON1.DOC 5/2/2005  8:59:42 AM 
2005] WHAT SHOULD LAW SCHOOL STUDENT CONDUCT CODES DO? 845 
termination of parental rights cases,244 the preponderance of the evidence 
standard used in most civil cases,245 or the lesser substantial evidence 
standard used in many administrative contexts.246  Given the above-
described jurisprudence regarding the requirements of due process in the 
academic disciplinary context,247 it is not surprising that courts have held 
that schools are not required to impose a higher burden of proof than the 
substantial evidence standard.248  However, numerous schools have 
chosen to impose more stringent standards, even up to the beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard.249  Given the stakes involved and the possible 
severity of the sanctions imposed in law school disciplinary contexts, it 
seems that a standard of at least a preponderance of the evidence or 
maybe even the clear and convincing standard would be appropriate, 
although the beyond a reasonable doubt standard would likely require 
too much in the way of proof for most disciplinary charges. 
Another question that needs to be discussed is whether hearings 
under the student conduct code should be open or closed.  As has been 
suggested already, there are a number of benefits that flow from open 
hearings.  First, the code’s educational function is served by allowing the 
largest possible segment of the student population to observe 
proceedings under the code.  Additionally, given that “sunlight is the 
best disinfectant,”250 proceedings under the code are likely to function 
better, and more fairly to all of the parties concerned, if they are 
conducted in full view of the members of the entire law school 
community.  Finally, the code’s deterrent function is likely to be 
improved by the greater awareness of the code achieved through greater 
student knowledge fostered by open code proceedings. 
On the other hand, legitimate interests are served by closed 
hearings.  Both the accused and the accuser have privacy concerns that 
militate in favor of closed hearings.  It is quite likely that an accused 
 
 243. See, e.g., In Re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1981) and cases cited therein. 
 244. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 752-57 (1982). 
 245. See, e.g., Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003) (noting that “conventional 
rule of civil litigation,” the preponderance of the evidence standard, generally applies in cases under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 246. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.A. §706(2)(E) (West 2002). 
 247. See supra notes 199-220 and accompanying text. 
 248. See Gorman v. Univ. of R.I., 646 F. Supp. at 813. 
 249. See DiMatteo & Wiesner, supra note 11, at 94; Fox, supra note 199, at 686-87 n.108; 
Carlos, supra note 10, at 967. 
 250. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (quoting L. Brandeis, Other People’s Money 
62 (National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933)) (“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for 
social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most 
efficient policeman.”). 
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student who is subsequently exonerated would prefer that the 
proceedings had been closed to the rest of the student body.  However, 
an effective pre-hearing investigatory procedure,251 should prevent non-
meritorious cases from going to a hearing.  Similarly, for reasons also 
discussed prior,252 anonymity for complainants under the code may lead 
toward more numerous and better supported reports of code violations. 
The FERPA may tip the balance between open and closed hearings.  
As mentioned previously,253 FERPA provides for the withholding of 
federal financial assistance from academic institutions that fail to protect 
the privacy of certain “education records.”254  Some disagreement exists 
as to whether documents relating to academic disciplinary proceedings 
fall within the definition of education records in the statute,255 let alone 
whether the disciplinary proceedings themselves constitute education 
records.  Nonetheless, the more recent and better reasoned decisions 
conclude that academic disciplinary records do fall within the statute’s 
purview,256 and that position is consistent with the Federal Department 
of Education’s interpretation of the statute.257  However, FERPA does 
 
 251. See supra note 227. 
 252. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra notes 178-79. 
 254. 20 U.S.C.S. §1232g(b).  See Bassler, supra note 104, at 230. 
 255. The statute defines education records as “those records, files, documents, and other 
materials which (i) contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an 
educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution.”  20 U.S.C.S. 
§1232g(a)(4)(A).  Certainly, a plain language interpretation of the definition would appear to 
include academic disciplinary records.  Accord United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 812 
(6th Cir. 2002).  Nonetheless, courts are divided on the issue.  See Caledonian-Record Publ’g Co., 
Inc. v. Vt. State Coll., 833 A.2d 1273, 1276-77 (Vt. 2003) (citing cases).  The Vermont Supreme 
Court in Caledonian-Record found it unnecessary to decide the question of whether academic 
disciplinary records are covered by FERPA, holding that such records were barred from disclosure 
under the Vermont Public Records Act.  Id.  However, in many instances, the federal statute’s 
incentive for confidentiality may appear to conflict with state law requirements for disclosure under 
either state open meeting laws or state public records acts.  See Bassler, supra note 104, at 233.  In 
circumstances where courts see a direct conflict between federal and state law, of course, the federal 
law trumps.  See, e.g., Rim of the World Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 11, 
12 (Cal. App. 2002) (stating that FERPA’s confidentiality provisions trump state law requiring 
disclosure of records relating to student expulsions); DTH Publ’g Co. v. Univ. of N. C., 496 S.E.2d 
8, 12 (N.C. App. 1998) (stating that FERPA trumps state open meeting law).  On the other hand, 
because FERPA does not require academic institutions to do anything, but rather, merely provides 
for the withholding of funds from schools that violate its provisions, other courts have viewed the 
statute as not directly conflicting with state statutes that require disclosure.  See Caledonian-Record, 
833 A.2d at 1276-77 (citing cases).  Finally, some state disclosure laws specifically exempt from 
disclosure documents are deemed to be confidential under Federal law.  See Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 
at 811 (noting that Ohio Public Records Act does not compel disclosure of records where release is 
prohibited by Federal law). 
 256. See, e.g., Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 797; Rim of the World, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11. 
 257. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 813 n.14 (citing 60 F.R. 3464, 3465 (1995)).  See also Bassler, 
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provide a couple of exceptions to its financial incentive against 
disclosure, the most pertinent being that a student may consent to 
disclosure of records that would otherwise be considered “private” under 
the statute.258 
This author contends that the benefits of open disciplinary 
proceedings outweigh any negative consequences that may result from 
such openness.  However, both the FERPA and the involved students’ 
privacy interests seem to make an automatic rule requiring open hearings 
implausible.  Thus, the code should state a preference for open hearings, 
and student prosecutors should be encouraged to seek the consent of 
both the accused and the accuser for an open hearing.  However, both 
the accused and the accuser should have the opportunity under the code 
to choose a closed hearing if that is their desire. 
3.  Post Hearing Procedures 
Most academic conduct codes provide for some type of review of 
the outcome of the disciplinary proceeding.259  While some law school 
codes provide for an actual appellate tribunal,260 others simply provide 
for review of the proceeding by the law school Dean261 or the full 
faculty.262  It is this writer’s view that if all of the above safeguards are 
applied to the initial disciplinary proceeding, review by the Dean is more 
than adequate to ensure that there was no miscarriage of justice in the 
original proceeding.  Of course, in order to allow for a thorough review 
 
supra note 104, at 232. 
 258. §1232g(d).  FERPA also provides an exception for “the final results of any disciplinary 
proceeding conducted by [an] institution against a student who is an alleged perpetrator of any 
crime of violence . . . or a nonforcible sex offense, if the institution determines . . . that the student 
committed a violation of the institution’s rules or policies with respect to such crime or offense.”  
Id. at §1232g(b)(6)(B). 
 259. See Carlos, supra note 10, at 969 & n.293. 
 260. See, e.g.,  NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIV., SHEPARD BROAD SCH. OF LAW HONOR CODE art. 
VI, available at http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/students/documents/honorcode00.pdf (last visited Feb. 
5, 2005); SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT §9, available at 
http://law.shu.edu/administration/student_services/honor_code/review_by_council.html (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2005). 
 261. See, e.g., UNIV. OF ARIZ. JAMES E. ROGERS COLL. OF LAW HONOR CODE §7, available at 
http://www.law.arizona.edu/Students/pdf/StudentHandbook.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); STETSON 
UNIV. COLL. OF LAW CODE OF STUDENT PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY art. III, §4(i), available at 
http://www.law.stetson.edu/studentlife/handbook/2000/policies.htm#art1 (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
 262. See, e.g.,  YESHIVA UNIV. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCH. OF LAW DISCIPLINARY CODE, 
RULES AND PROCEDURES art. IV, available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/current 
_students/pdf/handbk03.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005); WILLAMETTE UNIV. COLL. OF LAW 
STUDENT HANDBOOK §VII, available at http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/students/law_handbook. 
pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005). 
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of the proceedings, the institution should audio or videotape the 
proceedings and allow the student to transcribe the proceedings at her or 
his own expense if the student desires the record to be reviewed at that 
level of detail.263 
Additionally, decisions of the conduct code tribunal should be in 
writing and should be made available to the law school’s student body.  
Additionally, such decisions should be given at least some precedential 
value in future conduct code proceedings.  Somewhat surprisingly, such 
procedures are not presently followed at most schools.  As mentioned 
above, to the extent that a school adopts a broadly aspirational code, 
with very general language, making decisions interpreting the code 
available is an essential step in adequately defining how the code’s very 
generally language will be applied in particular contexts.264  However, 
even to the extent that a detailed regulatory code is adopted, published 
decisions provide a number of salutary consequences.  First, such 
decisions help to educate students as to conduct that is and is not 
permitted under the code.  Second, to the extent that such decisions are 
given at least some precedential weight in future conduct code 
proceedings, the prior decisions will help to ensure consistency in the 
treatment of similar conduct over time.  Such consistency is particularly 
difficult to achieve in academic disciplinary contexts, given the turnover 
in the personnel involved with the conduct code, including key student 
participants such as code prosecutors, defenders, and judges.  While a 
strict system of stare decisis might not be desirable in a conduct code 
context, at least some effort should be made to achieve consistency 
between decisions over time. 
Of course, the FERPA concerns addressed above265 apply with 
equal force to the disclosure of decisions of academic disciplinary 
proceedings.  However, courts have made clear that redaction of 
identifying information relating to particular students solves any FERPA 
concerns with regard to the results of academic disciplinary actions.266  
And, redaction of such identifying information should not limit any of 
the benefits of published decisions identified above.  Thus, conduct code 
tribunals should issue redacted versions of their written decisions 
following the completion of conduct code proceedings. 
 
 263. See Berger & Berger, supra note 16, at 344. 
 264. See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text. 
 265. See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text. 
 266. See, e.g., Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 814; Unincorporated Operating Div. of Ind. 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Tr. of Ind. Univ., 787 N.E.2d 893, 908 (Ind. App. 2003). 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing discussion, the conclusion here is that a 
law school code should be a relatively detailed set of regulatory rules, 
designed to foster an environment conducive to fair academic 
competition and equitable evaluation and review processes within a law 
school community.  The code should include substantive provisions 
detailing conduct which is impermissible in light of that goal, as well as 
procedures to be utilized to enforce those substantive provisions, and 
sanctions to be imposed in the event that violations of the code are 
established.  There are a number of positive reasons why a regulatory 
approach to law school codes should be preferred.  First, such an 
approach is consistent with the knowledge that graduate professional 
students already have regarding conduct that is not permissible in an 
academic setting.  Second, a regulatory approach is most consistent with 
both a decades long trend and the current state of regulation of the legal 
profession itself.  Having a law school code which mirrors the relevant 
professional code in that respect may help serve the law school’s goal of 
developing future legal practitioners who will practice effectively within 
the boundaries set forth by the relevant professional code. 
Another reason favoring a regulatory approach to law school codes, 
is that law school professors, administrators, and others who might be 
called upon to draft such codes are likely to possess to a great degree the 
skills and experience needed to draft such codes effectively, given the 
similarity of such codes to other types of legal codes.  Finally, given the 
conclusion here that providing a framework for fair academic 
competition and reliable evaluation and review mechanisms is the most 
important goal to be served by a law school code, the regulatory 
approach advocated seems most likely to serve that ultimate goal. 
There are also negative reasons why regulatory objectives should 
be favored over aspirational and educational ones in the law school code 
context.  First, for reasons outlined above, it is questionable whether, 
even under the best conditions, codes can effectively serve broadly 
aspirational functions.  And, to the extent that codes can successfully 
serve aspirational functions, it seems unlikely that the conditions needed 
to do so are present in the law school context.  For example, codes are 
most likely to be successful in serving broadly aspirational goals in 
small, homogeneous communities.  Yet most modern law schools lack 
those characteristics.  Additionally, aspirational codes must necessarily 
employ very broad standards and general language.  Yet such provisions 
are likely to undermine the very important regulatory goals of a code. 
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There is more reason to believe that a law school code can 
effectively serve at least some educational functions.  For example, a 
law school code can certainly provide examples of the types of conduct 
that are prohibited by the code, thus helping to educate students with 
regard to the code’s requirements.  Additionally, by allowing students to 
play important roles in administration of the code, and by opening code 
proceedings to the broader student population to as great an extent as is 
feasible, the code is also likely to serve additional educational functions.  
There is also reason to doubt, however, whether law school codes can 
have much impact on the education in ethics of future lawyers in the 
broadest sense (which of course, runs into the aspirational functions of 
the code as well).  Unless and until legal academics are willing to 
incorporate the law school code into the substantive materials that they 
teach, it seems unlikely that the code will provide education in ethics to 
a greater degree than outlined above.  And, there appears to be little 
appetite among legal academics to expand the role of the law school’s 
code into the substantive curriculum. 
Given all of these reasons, adopting a regulatory function as the 
primary goal of a law school code seems appropriate.  In light of that 
goal, this article next attempted to present the broad outlines of a code 
that would serve that goal.  Such a code would provide for an initial 
investigatory phase regarding alleged code violations, with students 
playing the key role in this and subsequent phases of the process under 
the code, in order to determine that only meritorious allegations be 
pursued.  Efforts would then be undertaken to resolve the allegations 
cooperatively, utilizing any of a number of familiar alternative dispute 
resolution techniques.  If efforts to resolve a meritorious allegation 
cooperatively are unsuccessful, however, then the opportunity for a full 
blown adversary hearing should be provided.  All of the hallmarks of 
due process should be available to the accused in such hearings, 
including adequate notice, the opportunity to discover in advance of 
hearing the evidence and witnesses that will be presented, the 
availability of student or professional counsel (at the accused’s expense), 
and the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. 
The standard of proof at hearings under the code should be at least 
a preponderance of, or perhaps even clear and convincing evidence.  
Such hearings should be open to the extent possible consistent with 
applicable federal and state law.  Redacted versions of the decisions of 
the relevant code tribunal should be made available to the entire law 
school community, and a loose system of precedent should be adopted 
so that prior code decisions are given at least some weight in deciding 
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future code proceedings.  Finally, there should be at least some 
opportunity for review of code tribunal proceedings by the Dean or some 
appellate body. 
Perhaps in light of the possible objectives of a law school code 
discussed in the beginning of this article, the ultimate objectives 
advocated here may sound unambitious or uninspiring.  However, the 
effective provision of an ethical environment within the law school for 
the conduct of the school’s core academic functions is no small 
accomplishment.  And, the provision of such an environment may well 
be at least a first step toward developing effective and ethical legal 
practitioners.  And that, after all, is the ultimate goal for many of us in 
legal academia. 
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